Closer by Committee

The ninth inning has historically been the domain of one dominant reliever, sent in to shut down whichever poor souls were scheduled to step into the batter’s box. Relatively new research shows that the shutdown closer is less important than previously thought; it’s hard to score a run with three outs against an average pitcher, and bettering the pitcher doesn’t provide enough return for the sometimes exorbitant cost of upgrading the back of the bullpen.

I’m an unabashed hater of the traditional closer role, believing that the same results can be had by intelligently mixing and matching existing bullpen options to achieve the same results. Coming into the season, I thought that the Orioles had a great mix of pitching talent to pull this off. After trading Jim Johnson for a bucket of balls Jemile Weeks, the team lacked a Proven Closer^TM but held a solid set of relievers who had shown well in specific situations. Since, Tommy Hunter has been named the official bullpen anchor, but let’s be honest: our friends over at CamdenChat call him Tommy Go Boom for a reason. There’s a not-insignificant possibility that the team will be trotting another guy out to the mound to open the ninth at some point this season.

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I’ve ignored pitching records in high-leverage situations because the ninth inning isn’t an inherently high-leverage situation. Indeed, often a pitcher enters at the beginning of the ninth inning with no outs and no men on base, and the pressure in the situation is created from the game’s predetermined endpoint being so near. It’s arguably far more difficult to come into a bases-loaded jam in an earlier inning and get an out or two without giving up a run. This is at the heart of the argument against closers: why save your very best relief pitcher for a potentially low-leverage situation in the ninth inning that may or may not even occur based on how the previous 24 outs play out when he can have a bigger impact on the game’s outcome and team’s record (and a better return on investment) if he’s thrown into high-leverage situations in the 6th, 7th, or 8th inning?

If the Orioles decided to get way ahead of the curve and follow the SABR book to the letter, what might the late innings look like in black and orange? The following chart shows the splits for wOBA against of the five relief pitchers who are good enough in spurts to completely shut down the opposing offense. I’ve left Evan Meek and Josh Stinson out of this because, well, someone as to pitch long relief.

Pitcher (Handedness)	wOBA vs. R	wOBA vs. L
Z. Britton (L)	.336	.317
T. Hunter (R)	.298	.363
B. Matusz (L)	.373	.273
D. O’Day (R)	.252	.316
R. Webb (R)	.290	.335

The first thing that jumps out at me is Tommy Hunter’s .363 wOBA against when pitching to left-handed batters. In his defense, these are career numbers shown, meaning his time as a starter (as well as Britton’s and Matusz’s) are counted in this average. Moving to the bullpen helped all three boost their velocity, which likely helps them improve the wOBA against on the bad side of their splits.

There’s a pretty clear split in this bullpen along the handedness lines, as many have come to expect. The only pitcher that performs similarly against batters from each side of the plate is Zach Britton, and his wOBA against can be beaten by changing pitchers along splits. I was curious to know if the Orioles’ relief pitchers are better suited for specific parks. That is, are flyball pitchers like Brian Matusz better off being used in larger ballparks?

Pitcher (Handedness)	wOBA vs. R, Home	wOBA vs. L, Home	wOBA vs. R, Away	wOBA vs. L, Away
Z. Britton (L)	.323	.258	.350	.381
T. Hunter (R)	.280	.349	.320	.377
B. Matusz (L)	.363	.275	.382	.272
D. O’Day (R)	.243	.338	.260	.293
R. Webb (R)	.275	.348	.306	.324

This chart comes with one large caveat: not all of these pitchers have called Oriole Park at Camden Yards home for the entirety of their careers. It’s unclear whether FanGraphs adjusts home and away splits to match the player’s current home park or whether it’s calculated using whatever park was considered home or away when the pitch was thrown.

Of course, the best pitcher should be asked to perform in high-leverage situations earlier in the game. But let’s assume that the goal of the Orioles is to put the relief pitcher with the best chance to make an out based on the batter scheduled to hit in during the ninth inning.

With these numbers, we can say that when the Orioles play at home, Darren O’Day should pitch the ninth against righties and Zach Britton should pitch the ninth against lefties. If Buck wanted to switch pitchers to match up against a R-L-R lineup and had the opportunity to do so, he should pitch Ryan Webb against one of the righties.

When on the road, O’Day should again pitch against righties, with Ryan Webb being the next-best option and still not even close to O’Day’s production. Against lefties, Matusz holds the edge, but the second option is, surprisingly, Darren O’Day. On the road, O’Day could conceivably pitch to righties and lefties and perform just about as well as an O’Day/Matusz platoon.

Tommy Hunter never has the best wOBA against for any Orioles relief pitchers, and actually performs worse against left-handed batters both home and away than anyone else that might be called upon to close. This is the guy that the Orioles are giving the ball in the ninth inning. It’s going to happen, people.

As an aside, I found it interesting that despite the Orioles’ solid bullpen options for platoons, not even very select match ups could stand up to Mariano Rivera’s career wOBA splits (.226 vs. L, .255 vs. R). Darren O’Day at home against righties is equivalent to Rivera’s entire career versus righties, and he was at one point a middling starting pitcher! And at another point, he was very old! For those keeping score at home, Jim Johnson’s career wOBA splits (.297 vs. R, .288 vs. L) are easily bested by a committee from the current Orioles bullpen.

The biggest issue with closing games by committee is that it’s difficult – impossible, actually – to tell if a certain situation will be trumped in leverage by a situation that has yet to happen. If the Orioles sent O’Day out in the 7th inning to get out of a two-on, one-out jam, he won’t be available for the bases-loaded, no-outs jam that happens in the ninth. It’s this thinking that stops managers from remedying high-leverage situations early in games with their best pitchers; they stand the risk of being ridiculed and possibly losing (the game, their job) later in the game when a more dangerous situation comes about. Nobody bothers to wonder whether the late-game situation would have meant as much had the worse pitcher given up a handful of runs in the early situation.

As a related argument against closing by committee, if a manager goes crazy playing matchups in the 8th and 9th innings, or before if he’s particularly progressive, he runs the risk of heading into the late innings with a shallow bullpen – or no bullpen, if the planning backfires and the game goes into overtime.

Nonetheless, I maintain that Tommy Hunter is an adequate late-inning option, but letting him pitch to those who perform best against him is a recipe for disaster. To Buck’s and the Orioles’ credit, O’Day is typically seen in the 8th inning regardless of whether it’s shaping up to look like a save situation. Getting the best bullpen pitcher the opportunity to keep the game close or maintain a lead in nearly every game is ideal. After that, the ninth inning should be the domain of a Frankenstein made from the parts of Ryan Webb, Zach Britton, Brian Matusz, and Tommy Hunter depending on the situation and ballpark.