On Tuesday afternoon, news came out that the Orioles are nearing a three-year deal with Yovani Gallardo worth between $40-45 million dollars. Gallardo declined the Rangers’ qualifying offer which means he has draft pick compensation tied to him and will cost the Orioles the 14th overall pick this summer. That alone is enough to feel less-than-thrilled about the deal for the team given their barren system.

(You can discuss this on the BSL Board here.)

It’s not so much that they had to keep the pick, it’s more that Gallardo just wasn’t the best spot to use it. Signing Justin Upton would’ve been worth it. Same for Alex Gordon. Hell, Hisashi Iwakuma would’ve been worth it, even being five years older than the 30-year right-hander. Gallardo had some decent results with Texas, his first year in the AL, but it’s not readily evident in his profile how can emulate those results, or better yet improve upon them. After all, he still had just a 1.42 WHIP.

He posted a 3.42 ERA in 184.3 innings on the strength of a groundball lean that has taken hold over the last three seasons and transitioned him out of being a strikeout pitcher like he was in the prime of his Brewers career. From 2009-12, Gallardo had four straight seasons with a 24% or better strikeout rate (between 9 and 10 K/9), but he has been steadily declining since with 19%, 18%, and 15% marks the last three seasons. His swinging strike rate is tumbling in concert, offering little hope for a rebound.

One big reason behind the strikeout decline has been the rise of the slider. Literally. As he brings it up in the zone on average, it has generated fewer swings-and-misses. That isn’t terribly surprising, especially when you see this great article by Eli Ben-Porat that deep-dives the slider and highlights how swinging strike rate falls as the pitch moves up:

This model estimates that, for every foot lower you can throw your slider, you’ll gain about 10 points of SwStr%.

Gallardo had a 20% strikeout rate with his slider from 2009-2014 (data unavailable for 2007-08), but then posted a meager 11% mark in 2015. He threw just 47% of his sliders in the lower third of the zone – 135th out 148 starters who threw at least 100 sliders – well below the 61% league average (and Gallardo’s own average coming into ’15). He was throwing his slider in zone less and less prior to 2015, but last year was the cliff dive, since ‘09: 61%, 62%, 62%, 61%, 60%, 59%, and then the 47%. Given that it was such a sharp change last year, maybe he reverts back closer to his mean, but if the strikeouts don’t tick back upward, he could be in big trouble.

While he has managed to keep the ERA respectable – 3.70 in the last three seasons and on a downward trend – the WHIP has been atrocious at 1.36 and could become especially problematic in the AL East. The parks and offenses in the AL East could send his home run back upward, too. His 0.73 HR/9 last year was third-best in his career, but he has a 0.92 for his career including several years north of 1.0.

Perhaps the biggest issue with signing Gallardo and paying a pick is the fact that there were comparable arms available for much less money and no pick. Let’s look at them in comparison to Gallardo over the last three seasons:

Name Age IP K/BB K% BB% SwStr% HR/9 WHIP ERA FIP Contract
Yovani Gallardo 30 557.1 2.2 17% 8% 7% 0.87 1.36 3.70 3.95 3-yr, $40-45mm (Bal)
Doug Fister 32 475.2 3.5 16% 5% 7% 0.87 1.25 3.35 3.77 1-yr, $7mm (Hou)
Mat Latos 28 429.1 3.1 20% 7% 10% 0.75 1.22 3.67 3.40 1-yr, $3mm (Chi-AL)
J.A. Happ 33 422.2 2.6 20% 8% 8% 1.02 1.34 4.05 3.93 3-yr, $36mm (Tor)
Justin Masterson 31 381 2.1 22% 10% 9% 0.76 1.41 4.61 3.98 Free Agent
Rich Hill 36 73 2.4 30% 13% 10% 0.62 1.36 4.19 3.20 1-yr, $6mm (Oak)

The only thing Gallardo has on the group is innings, but those innings aren’t worth the vast disparity in contract value, plus the pick – which I keep harping on, but it’s a huge part of why this deal is just not that great.

  • Fister is coming off of a brutal year with his strikeout and swinging strike rates tanking even harder than Gallardo’s, but I’d still prefer betting on a rebound for one year at seven mil compared as opposed to a multi-year commitment and pick.
  • Latos is the most glaring comparison that makes this deal for Gallardo look especially bad. He was signed right around the time the Gallardo news was breaking and it’s hard not think Chicago’s $3 million dollar investment isn’t way better – even accounting for the potential attitude issues that Latos brings with him.
  • I’m not giddy about Happ back in the AL East after that magical run with Pittsburgh, but I put him on here because it’s the same years, less cash, and no pick for a pitcher who is at least as good albeit three years older.
  • Not a huge Masterson fan, either, but he’s going to be dirt-cheap when he does finally sign. Injuries might be a big issue that is keeping teams away, so I get it, but his ERA indicators are right in line with Gallardo’s and he’s an even better groundballer than Gallardo.
  • Hill is a big gamble given his low innings count and high age (eldest on the list), but he still would’ve been a better bet, even as more of a flyball pitcher in his career (though his GB% was at 48% in his small 2015 sample).

Between Gallardo’s declining skills, the pick, and the availability of comparable arms at much cheaper prices make it tough feel great about this move. Yes, the team did need a steady, veteran-type arm for the middle of the rotation, but this wasn’t the best deployment of their resources.

Paul Sporer
Paul Sporer

Paul Sporer is currently a contributor to FanGraphs / RotoGraphs. He has worked for/still works for Rotowire, Baseball Prospectus, Rotogrinders, The Fantasy Fix, Draft Day, and PaintTheBlack.com – his own website centered around pitching. Additionally, he’s written for several Baseball Prospectus Annuals, contributed to Rotowire’s 2015 magazine, and spoken at a couple of BaseballHQ First Pitch Arizona events. His popular starting pitching guide is available at paulsporer.com.

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