The last time we visited the models, it was the All Star Break.  They stood 4.5 games back of the division leading Red Sox and 1 game behind the Texas Rangers for the second Wild Card.  Almost two months later and the Red Sox have added another 4.5 games to their lead over the Orioles.  Baltimore also finds themselves now 2 games behind the second Wild Card, now occupied by the Tampa Bay Rays.  In other words, the team with its additions of Bud Norris, Scott Feldman, Francisco Rodriguez, and Mike Morse have tread water.  Treading water is not a bad thing, but the team needs to excel over the next three weeks in order to see post season baseball.

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What do the projections say?

As the season winds down, all of the projection models are settling on the high 80s as the Orioles’ final resting point.  This has been the average projection for the club since April 29th this year.

How does fWAR see things in general?

For the American League:

For the NL:

The post Paper Orioles: 9/10/2013 appeared first on Baltimore Sports and Life.

Francisco Rodriguez, also known as K-Rod, will be asked to bolster the O’s bullpen. (Photo: Jared Wickerham/Getty Images North America.)

First off, read Luke Jackson’s great writeup of the Francisco Rodriguez-Nicky Delmonico deal that went down last week.  Second, I want to frame the discussion some more.  No, I do not wish to discuss my perspective Rodriguez pleading guilty to attempted assault to avoid jail time when he attacked his at-the-time fiance’s father or about the time he attacked Mets’ bullpen coach during a game or the allegations of repeated abuse that the prosecution came up with or about the Milwaukee abuse case that was dropped when his at-the-time girlfriend (who was allegedly attacked) and the sole alleged witness (a housekeeper) went back to Venezuela and were no longer around for the trial.  I think that perspective has been overly hashed out on the message board here at Baltimore Sports and Life.

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What I want to discuss are best case scenarios in a general sense using simple numbers to see how big a deal acquiring Rodriguez was for the success of the team.  I want to assume the following:

1. With 58 games left, there are about 25 innings left for the 7th inning righty, 8th inning righty, and middle relief / junk inning righty.

2. Francisco Rodriguez is a 3.00 ERA pitcher (let’s assume he is really solid down the stretch).

3. Tommy Hunter and Darren O’Day are 4.00 ERA pitchers (let’s assume they struggle down the stretch to the point that they are underperforming their current ERAs of 2.80 and 2.20, respectively).

4. Jairo Asencio and whoever are 6.00 ERA pitchers (this is likely a pessimistic view as to what the default 4th righty in the pen could do).

So, here is what we get without Rodriguez.

This is what happens with Francisco Rodriguez as the 8th inning righty:

So, the difference under what is likely a best case scenario is about 9 runs.  In a general sense, 9 runs equates to a win when you normalize conditions.  But, is that the best way to look at this?

Some of you may be aware of something called a Leverage Index.  This metric looks at how important a situation is in a game and is based on the number of outs, baserunners, men on base, and the score.  A neutral scenario would have a Leverage Index of 1 while really consequential plate appearances would be greater than one.  Here are the Leverage Indices of Orioles relievers when they enter a game:

Those numbers pass the sniff test.  Johnson, O’Day, and Matusz are often placed in on the mound in tough situations.  Strop, too, as the team tried to make him workout before inevitably giving up and shipping him to the Cubs.  The point I am trying to make here is that even though the different between the two assumed righty sets above amount to 9 runs, 6 of those runs are saved in junk innings that normally would have gone to guys like Burnett, Johnson, Gausman, and, yes, Asencio.  Those scenarios were ones where the game was largely in the Orioles’ favor or their opponents’.  Those runs are not very meaningful when they are given up (almost always).

Instead, the important runs in the optimistic scenario above would be the 3 runs do not score thanks to 3.00 ERA Rodriguez on the mound instead of 4.00 ERA O’Day.  From there we simply have to wonder how important those three runs are.  A general appreciation of what a run is worth would suggest that having Rodriguez is worth about a third of a win due to those 3 runs saved.  However, runs scored in high leverage situations are likely to be worth a different amount than runs scored in less important situations.  For an idea, let’s see how O’Day have been used lately.

Here is the score differential of the July outings when O’Day entered the game:

Five (or 56%) of his July outings were games where the differential in score was 0 runs or the Orioles being up by 1.  If that stays the same then of those 25 8th innings to come, 14 of them will be games where the score is tied or the team is holding on by one run.  That difference now is about 2 runs (slightly less) in what you could expect between a 3.00 pitcher and a 4.00 pitcher.  That suggests than maybe the value of a third of a run more important, might be lower than that.

However, let’s not end the discussion there.  Let us assume that for 12 of those innings pitched, Rodriguez and O’Day would be the same pitcher, but for the other two Rodriguez would give up no runs and O’Day would give up a run in each performance.  Well, how does that impact win probability.

So, why are the probabilities different?  Well, it almost all comes down to the home team having two innings to score while the visitor having only one.  If we look at the worst case scenarios (as a vistor going +1 to 0; as a home team going 0 to -1), we have decreases in win probability of 37% and 33%.  In other words, not letting runs score in the worst cases possible detailed above means a 3.00 pitcher is worth about 0.7 wins more than a 4.00 pitcher.  In other words, the runs saved in the 8th inning in high leverage conditions are roughly twice as important than they are in general based on the assumptions I have made here.

Have you made it this far?  It has been a bit of a trip through math and a variety of assumptions.  Where we are left is that under ideal circumstances, it is probably safe to assume that the addition of Rodriguez will benefit the team with an extra game in the win column, at most.  More likely though, his impact will be far less felt.  Differences in runs saved in high leverage innings will likely be rather inconsequential and applying Hunter to even lower leverage innings will likely be even more inconsequential.

In the end, the team gave up a second tier prospect in Nicky Delmonico.  A position player who was 100th ranked in Baseball America’s top 100 prospects has a 1 in 3 chance of being a useful starter in baseball.  At best, Delmonico was just south of 150th and probably no worse the 200th.  More than likely he will never make a dent on a MLB roster.  Even more important, Delmonico would have had zero impact on the Orioles in 2013 when they are competing for a playoff spot.  In other words, one would be pressed to call him a meaningful prospect.

However, Delmonico does not need to be a meaningful prospect to have value.  I’d suggest that his ability to augment a trade package is probably worth more than him being traded straight up for a reliever who at best makes the 2013 Orioles a +1 win team.  It is difficult to ever know what is possible in trades and it is an illness in the brain that us followers of the game tend to want to believe in an abundance of trade opportunities, but I do think that a package of Delmonico plus one would likely bring back to the Orioles a player of greater importance than Rodriguez.  Of course, this contention is somewhat unfair.  It is difficult for the addition of Rodriguez to stand up against a comparison of something that does not exist.  The vagueness of the unknown is certainly a draw for many to embrace and questioning Oriole front office authority has been a talent that has been thoroughly developed over the past decade and a half.  That said, I maintain that the health of the franchise is better served when second tier prospects are stacked instead of being doled out one at a time.

In the end, this is more or less opinion attached to math (somewhat well founded in reality).  It can be taken to thrown away as it is.  Whatever happens, whether a World Series run behind a stalwart bullpen or Rodriguez giving his best Paul Shuey impersonation, the decision should be based on what we know now at the time of the deal and not what transpires as I think unintended success or failure should not be the deciding factor in determining whether or not the right process was chosen to make the decision.

Anyway, those are my thoughts on the acquisition of Francisco Rodriguez as it pertains to what may develop on the field of play.

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The idea of him having his finger on the pulse of international baseball was considered even more silly by those writing outside of the beltway when the front office hirings began to happen after Duquette signed on.  Ray Pointevit, who was in his 70s and outside of organized professional ball for a while, was signed on as the executive director of international baseball.  On the face of things, it was a good story.  He made a name for himself in Baltimore as a scout and is certainly a recognizable name.  However, he was also in charge of funneling a lot of questionable talent from Korea and was involved in the circus of the Million Dollar Arm competition in India.  By this time, he seemed more like a character that would have been dreamed up by some modern incarnation of Joseph Conrad.  Anyway, it appears that honeymoon ended quickly as it now sounds that Pointevit’s presence has receded a bit either by the emergence of local scouts in Korea, restrictions the KBA has placed on the Orioles in response to Pointevit horrible fiasco with the Kim Seung-Min affair (which doubled in its awfulness when the guy Pointevit talked up about having scouted for two years wound up being nothing at all like his scouting report as well as some allegations that perhaps Pointevit was a bit too cuddly with his former Korean talent scouting company), or maybe it is just time for the elder statesman to enjoy retirement…or maybe he is still just as involved, but I simply do not hear about him anymore.  Anyway, you do not hear too much about the Orioles’ Pacific rim endeavors and they have spent very little money out there.

Anyway, the other curious hiring of a one time great was Fred Ferreira, scout extraordinaire of Latin America.  Where Pointevit connected Duquette to the emerging markets with the Red Sox.  Ferreira was his life line during his Expos days.  Whether by design or by monetary restrictions, the direction the team has gone in the Latin American market.  They have ignored high ticket bonus babies and have focused instead on lower mid-level amateurs and older players who have had some major questions attached to them.  One of those current signings has just splashed the MLB stage, Henry Urrutia.  He was not highly sought after as there were concerns over his ability to hit for power and contact, plate discipline, and general inability to show anything promising when he wore a glove.  Also, as a mid-20 year old, teams are less likely to dream and look beyond deficiencies.  At this point, it seems the Orioles got at least an excellent minor league hitter.  We will see how he does at the MLB level over the next couple of months.

However, I have no interest in diving into Urrutia.  I want to look at the Ferreira Mexican League find, Miguel Gonzalez.  When Ferreira saw Gonzalez pitch in the Mexican league before the Orioles signed him in 2012, he saw a pitcher with average stuff who had great command and a good plan when on the mound.  Gonzalez was not a stranger to the professional game, having bounced around with varying degrees of success and varying degrees of health in the minors.  However, Ferreira saw the Orioles’ organization was in need of starting pitching depth and Gonzalez could, at least, provide that.  He did that and more.  Again, his pitches look average, but his command is stellar.  He was a major reason why the Orioles made the playoffs last year and is a major reason why the team has a chance this year to do the same.

One thing I find interesting is comparing two metrics that try to describe how valuable Miguel Gonzalez actually is: bWAR and fWAR.  Wins Above Replacement is a generic name given to a variety of metrics used to discern production levels in players by translating everything to wins.  Two of the predominant systems available in the public sphere are those used by Baseball Reference and FanGraphs.  They do not use the same methodology.  However, both (as of this offseason and now retroactively applied) are on the same scale.  The major difference between the two systems is that Baseball Reference treats pitchers as responsible for contact quality while FanGraphs assumes that contact quality will typically regress for all pitchers over time.  In terms of a population, I think that Fangraphs’ approach is more accurate, but it results in a few players being incredibly under or over valued.  Innings Pitched for the 2012 (105.1) and 2013 (107.2) are fairly similar, so lets compare the rest of the big numbers.

Although I would not call two points associated with 105.1 and 107.2 IP definitive, I would say that there does appear to be an emerging pattern (again, not a known) that Miguel Gonzalez is capable of producing poor contact.  His fWAR suggests that he is performing at a level that is rough a 3/4 slot pitcher.  The assumptions are that his batted balls should regress to population standards and that he has been fortunate with runners stranded on base.  These assumptions may not be accurate.  The longer that Gonzalez outperforms his defense independent statistics, the more we should consider that maybe he does something special that is difficult to discern using our current statistical toolbox.  If this perspective sounds a little familiar, it is one that has often accompanied Jeremy Guthrie who significantly outperformed his FIP even with some pretty shoddy Orioles defense behind him.

Another reason why he might be able to outperform his FIP is because he prevents stolen bases.  During his career as an Orioles, a runner successfully steal a base on Gonzalez once every 71 innings pitched.  For the Orioles’ starters not name Miguel Gonzalez, a base is stolen every 22 innings pitched.  That seems pretty exceptional.  What is league average?  One base stolen every 16 innings pitched.  In other words, Gonzalez sees about 4 fewer stolen bases every 80 innings.  A stolen base is worth about a third of a run with respect to linear weights.  If you account for that, then his ERA this year would be about 3.77 or a little less than halfway from his ERA to his FIP.  So, stolen base prevention is not the only thing that may be helping him prevent scoring.

As we have seen before with Chris Tillman, pitching strategies can change greatly depending on whether men are on base or the paths being empty.  The average pitcher in bases empty scenarios faces batters who wind up with a slash of 252/311/409.  When someone gets on base, things stay basically the same except that walks and singles increase creating a slash of 262/330/409.  With Gonzalez, he has shown very similar slash lines during his two seasons.  Combined, with bases empty: 238/298/426.  Combined, men on base: 255/352/387.  We see walks shooting up tremendously and power disappearing.  It is impressive to see ISO drop from .192 to .132 (similar to Tillman’s .207 to .145 in those respective scenarios).

Looking at Pitch F/X we also see his pitch selection changes:

Now, considering how performance changes between overall batter performance and men on base batter performance, you get a difference in wOBA of .017.  That is a run difference of 1.8 runs every 100 plate appearances.  That is worth roughly 3 runs…which takes us up to a 4.01 ERA (which includes the stolen base figure we derived above).  At the present time, I cannot account for the remainder of 0.21 runs.  It may be something that could be simple chance or maybe some element of pitching that I cannot think to address here or an element that as of yet has yet to be measured well.

Anyway, the take home is that there are good reasons why we should think the real value of Miguel Gonzalez’ pitching to date is better represented in the bWAR approach and not the fWAR approach.  This does not mean one is better or worse than the other for all cases.  Only that in this instance, for this player, bWAR might be the one you should glance at first.

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Here is what Wieters has accomplished so far:

As you can see above, Wieters has been an excellent catcher.  He has been worth a great deal of value to the team and has deserved his two All Star appearances and at least one of his Gold Gloves.  To say he has had no value is simply untrue.  That is evident.  Whether or not he will be worth something in the future is another story.  This begs the question: can the Orioles replace Wieters and can they replace him for less money?

Over the past few years, there have been some options on the market:

Over the past four years, five average to above average catchers have hit the market: John Buck (one of two times), Miguel Olivo (one of two times), Russell Martin (twice), and AJ Pierzynski (one of two times).  It is not an excellent record.  This should not seem surprising because teams tend to keep a hold of catchers, shortstops, and centerfielders.  These positions rarely make their way to the open market.  Those that do have major concerns and produce unevenly.

How does the 2014 market shaping up?

Brian McCann is the only blue chipper and is likely to make more money than what Wieters will earn over the next couple years.  Buck and Pierzynski have uncertainty attached to them.  Molina has no offensive capabilities, but, arguably, is an All Star quality catcher simply with his ability to frame pitches.  Salty has been offensively similar to what Wieters has been doing this year, but with obviously worse defense.  I’m not sure whether he represents much in terms of saving money to spend elsewhere.

In the end, we have the likelihood that Wieters’ performance cannot be replaced without spending considerably if McCann hits the open market.  That said, perhaps Wieters could bring back something useful beyond promising.

Why could Wieters bring back in a trade?

If we assume that Wieters is in fact a first division catcher, then the general trade structure would be a top 25, top 50, and top 100 prospect.  Who has perhaps the need for a top notch catcher along with the horses to pull this off?

Athletics

Addison Russell, SS

Michael Choice, OF

Sonny Gray, RHP

The Athletics’ MO has not typically been to give up prospects to acquire a single player.  However, they do have a need behind the plate.  Derek Norris and John Jaso are not the most useful guys behind the plate.  However, they cost less than Wieters.  Far less when you consider premier talent Addision Russell (who would keep Machado as third base).  Michael Choice, a decent outfield prospect who can at least fill in at all three fields, has plus power potential.  Sonny Gray is a poor man’s Chris Sale.  He has a great chance of being a solid closer and a slight chance of being a very useful starting pitcher.

Nationals

Anthony Rendon, 3B

Lucas Giolito, RHP

Brian Goodwin, OF

Anthony Rendon is more and more showing that he belongs in the Majors, so I have doubts he would be available.  However, if the Nationals think they can resolve 2B more easily than C or that the oft-injured Rendon is not a good fit at second, then they may reconsider.  His presence on the Orioles would shift Machado to SS and make J.J. Hardy a surplus.  Giolito is just getting back into baseball after having Tommy John surgery last year.  He profiles as a plus-plus fastball and plus curve starting pitcher with top of the rotation potential, but more likely a 2 or 3 slot as his ceiling.  Goodwin has solid tools and is slowly putting it all together.  He could be a solution to having Adam Jones move to left field in a few years.

Yankees

Gary Sanchez, C

Rafael De Paula, RHP

Tyler Austin, OF

I have no doubt that the Yankees would be quite interested in making a deal for Matt Wieters.  There are some who think the Orioles should be willing to send him to New York City before the Yanks simply outbid the Orioles for his services in a couple years when Wieters is scheduled to become a free agent.  What could the Orioles get?  I passed on Slade Heathcott and Mason Williams.  Both are incredibly promising players, but have some non-baseball challenges they need to overcome that I would not personally want to take on.  Gary Sanchez has had difficulty taking to the catching slot and his offense might not be enough to play elsewhere.  If all goes well, he is an All Star catcher around 2016 or 2017.  De Paula has some issues with his age claims (he is actually 22), but he shows excellent stuff.  He could be a mid-rotation arm or a solid late inning arm.  Finally, Austin is struggling a bit in AA, but profiles as a Nick Markakis like RF.  Solid defense, solid doubles power, and good athleticism.

—–

As I see it, those are pretty much the options the team has in front of them.  My preference still is to extend Wieters and move forward with him.  Prospects are excellent to acquire, but they do take time to develop and very few wind up giving elite performance.

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Kevin Gausman pitching at home for the Orioles

The Orioles were one of the first teams to move on the trade market by acquiring Scott Feldman from the Cubs for some international spending privileges, eternally promising Jake Arrieta, and frequently confounding Pedro Strop.  Feldman shored up the rotation by providing a solid backend rotation arm that is certainly more dependable than maintaining the hope that Zach Britton, Jair Jurrjens, or Kevin Gausman would provide useful innings.  Feldman may not have been a pretty acquisition, but may be a big player if the Orioles make the playoffs by a game or two (that is about what he is worth to the team over the five slot options available to the team–he is not really a 5.79 ERA pitcher as his three starts to date state).

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The team could certainly use more starting pitching, but the play now would have to be for an elite arm as any addition would mean the demotion of Jason Hammel or Scott Feldman to the bullpen.  I think we can be rest assured, assuming no injuries to the starting rotation, that we will not see any further starting rotation additions.  However, there does seem to be some room in the bullpen.  Right now, the team is getting good performance out of their three lefties (i.e., Troy Patton, Brian Matusz, T.J. McFarland) and their three main righties (i.e., Jim Johnson, Darren O’Day, Tommy Hunter).  The problem is though that in the middle innings they have been light on right handed pitching.  Johnson is swallowed up in the 9th and O’Day is the setup man.  This leaves Hunter and a right-handed revolving door available for the middle innings.  With the starting rotation’s knack for handing the ball over in the 6th or 7th innings, a right handed answer not named Jairo Asencio would be a good thing to have.

Perhaps the rumored Chris Dickerson deal will wind up with the Orioles finding a right handed relief arm.

So who is likely available?

Those are typically the numbers I look at on a reliever when I am trying to make quick decisions.  I like to see the interplay between ERA and FIP with a secondary assessment looking at career differences to see if said player is one of those who is not well represented by FIP.  It can give a general indication if the player is over or under performing.  I like outs where the ball is not in play, so strikeouts are great.  I also like few baserunners, so walks are great to look at.  I prefer groundballs as flyballs have an affinity for the bleachers at Camden Yards.  Finally, I check on fastball velocity.  The less time the ball is in the strikezone usually means the pitcher will be harder to hit in the long term (of course, a plethora of caveats on that statement).  Anyway, these are the rough numbers I seek first.

The 95 MPH Club

If I was in a front office, then you would probably see my club accumulating lots of lots of pitchers who throw harder than 95 mph.  Of course, 95 mph means little when a pitcher has no movement on the ball (read: Jim Hoey), but it is a solid starting point when finding fringe players or looking for someone who has more standing power when they display good performance at the MLB level.  The group of players who fit this subset above include John Axford and Matt Lindstrom.  Of these two, I believe in Lindstrom.

Why does the ex-closer John Axford concern me?  Well, a few things emerge that make me question whether he can continue performing at a 3.63 ERA level.  Career-wise, his ERA tracks his FIP pretty closely, so I think he is bound for a regression to his career line.  Adding to that red flag, is a decrease in his K rate from a career line of 11.1 to 9.3 while reducing his first pitch strikes by about 12%.  He also has benefited from being able to leave his baserunners on base at a career best mark.  The final red flag for me is that he has reducing his fastball usage by about 18% and is much more heavily reliant on his curve ball.  An additional concern is that he has two more years of team control after this year, so he may be seen as more valuable for some teams.  If he is cheap, excellent.  If he is going to cost me a decent prospect, then I have no interest at all.

I like Matt Lindstrom.  He is not the prettiest of pitchers.  He has some red flags with a slight decrease in strikeouts and a big increase in walks.  Lindstrom’s value may be bloated due to his excellent ERA (he has been exceptionally lucky to not give up a single home run this year), which may make his value somewhat prohibitive for what he is.  That said…he performs.  He is a bit of a journeyman pitcher who tends to do well, but is shuttled off to somewhere else the following year (see Octavio Dotel).  He is not someone who I would peg as a setup man, but he has performed at that role well in the past.  I think he will come cheaper than Axford as Lindstrom is not considered much as a former closer.

The Rest

As you can probably tell, I am not really sold on any of the above.  I think with this group of relievers that I would be looking more at dealing a C level prospect, nothing more.  My focus would likely be on the following pitchers:

1. Chad Qualls

2. Chad Gaudin

3. Joe Smith

4. Matt Albers

5. Matt Lindstrom

Qualls is a solid pitcher with a good track record and a club, the Marlins, who are eager to deal him.  The Marlins tend to gravitate to more athletic players in their trades and have matched up their interests well with the Orioles in the past.  It seems that the Orioles second and third tier prospects that former Marlin Joe Jordan built up still matches well to what the Marlins see as good buys on the second and third tier trade market.  With Qualls on the club, Hunter would probably find himself dropped to the 6th inning bridge.  Qualls has benefited from an exceptional ground ball rate and stranded baserunners, so some might find him more valuable than I think him to be.

Chad Gaudin is having his first good year in about eight seasons.  His place in the past has been that of a spot starter, garbage time pitcher.  This year, he has been pretty lights out for the Giants.  With that team sliding backwards, it probably is a good idea for them to get what they can from Gaudin before he likely departs in free agency.  Then again, the Giants tend to fall hard for their veteran players, so a two year deal would not be entirely unexpected as well.  Anyway, Gaudin has found a way to get batters to really chase his slider this year.  I am not sure why, but it has been exceptionally useful.  Regression is a concern, but it might be useful to have him spell the 6th and provide another arm capable of filling in for a double header or if someone goes down.

Joe Smith and Matt Albers are two pitchers who might be difficult to pry.  Why?  Well, the Indians are a game and a half out of the division lead.  I keep expecting them to fall apart, but as long as they don’t…they are unlikely to change hands.  This is especially true when one considers that the Indians are also in need of relief pitching.  Jake Arrieta probably could have been used to acquire one of them if the Indians believed in him, but I am not sure there is much of a match.  They both are guys though I would kick the tires on and see how the Indians would react.

Matt Lindstrom was covered before, but this is where I would place him.  He has shown an ability to be competitive in the American League.  He throws hard and batters miss (though not as much as they should with a fastball that hard).  Lindstrom mainly gets by when he is able to induce poor contact.  The dependence might be a reason why he jumps so much even though he is a decent performer.  His stuff simply looks like it should be better than it actually winds up being.

That said, if those five are cost prohibitive or simply not available, I would then troll for the bottom level players who still might be useful (this level is where a Chris Dickerson might begin to make sense for a team).  This would include players like Burton, Badenhop, Gregerson, and Stauffer.  All of these players have the ability to perform well enough as a sixth inning man and are certainly guys I would trust more in that position than the arms that have been recently tried out there.  Kevin Gausman is really the only internal option I find interesting at the moment and he simply is not ready.  He will be soon, probably next year.

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Anyway, here is where we are with the projections:

As mentioned before, the team is hovering in its projection.  Here is how Baseball Prospectus has viewed their postseason chances.

Now, what does this tell me?  It tells me that the Orioles are within striking distance of the playoffs.  Furthermore, even though any added players are unlikely to help the team make the playoffs due to them being unlikely to significantly add a win or two to the total team total, we do not know if their presence in the playoffs is in doubt only by a win or two.  This is really one of those moments where it makes sense to mortgage elements of the future to better your team.  Perhaps, mortgage all of it is a foolhardy proposition, but the loss of a Jonathan Schoop or Nicky Delmonico is not the worst thing that could happen.  Combine that with the window shutting on Nick Markakis’ or J.J. Hardy’s time with the team and it makes sense to make a jump for that window.

And now the full fWAR standings for the AL:

And the NL:

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My reason for bringing that up is that, yeah, Jones does get unfair treatment.  I also think that there is also a lot of people who over appreciate him as those who under appreciate him.  My view has remained pretty steady over the year with him being a very good hitter with some pitch recognition issues that will prevent him from ever being an elite hitter.  In addition, his great defensive talent is limited by his poor initial reads and below average hands.  I think as he ages, his marginal, but highlight film worthy, play in centerfield will play much better in left than it would in right.  In fact, I think we already are seeing it.  Outside of his excellent play last night, Jones has seen some decrease in his ability to hold runners going from being one of the best in centerfield three years ago to being league average last year and this year.  There is some talk about how gold gloves are often handed out for seasons prior (as well as for offensive prowess) and that just might be the case.  All that said, he is certainly a fine player to have in the lineup and play centerfield.

As you can see in the table below.  For qualified centerfielders, Jones ranks 6th out of 22 for Runs Created.  If you turn it into a rate, then he drops down to 8th and in a tie with Jacoby Ellsbury.  That is a fringe elite centerfielder.  Defensive metrics (and a significant number of scouts) tend to rate Jones as below average in center field.  If you accept those assessments, then you wind up with a player who is an average to slightly above average centerfielder.

Offensive Numbers for Qualified CFs (>280 PA with 140 as CF) for 2013

However, this is not what I really wished to write about on Jones.  Above is merely a false start to the column.  The remarkable thing about Jones this year is that he has a shot of making history.  At this moment with 94 games in, Jones has 10 walks in 405 plate appearances.  If he winds up playing every game for the rest of the year and maintains not only the walk rate, but the plate appearance rate as well, then he should finish the year with the following numbers:

698 plate appearances

17 walks

Below is the comprehensive table of players who had logged at least 698 plate appearances and have earned fewer than 20 walks.

Yes, above is the comprehensive list of players who have accomplished what Jones is setting out to do if he maintains this pace, which (admittedly) is a pace that is extraordinary for him and, as a general rule, we should never assume that extraordinary paces will continue (sorry, Chris Davis).  If Jones reverts back to his 4.9% walk rate then he will wind up with 24 walks. Just a word about Woody Jensen…this was not a very good season.  His offensive numbers made him worth about three runs below replacement value.

The comprehensive list for batters with 698 plate appearances and 25 or fewer walks?

That is still a pretty exclusive club.  However, contrary to the army of one that is Jensen (to date), this group actually has a couple of players who puts up big seasons.  Felipe Alou’s 1966 season was in an offensively depressed era and was explosive enough to put him in fifth for MVP voting.  Soriano’s second year in the big leagues was enough to earn him a third place finish in voting in 2002.  So a dearth of walks alone does not mean a failed hitter.  It can certainly contribute to being a failed hitter, but it is not a guaranteed way to arrive there.

So has anything changed in pitch location or swing rate for Jones from last year to this year?

Three things really seemed to emerge from this data.  First, it does not appear that pitchers have changed their approach with respect to location from last year to this year (also, pitch type is not shown here, but that has not changed either).  Two, that Jones has improved his contact rate when swinging for balls, but that improved contact rate has resulted in a rather sizable decrease in power.  Three, Jones has swung more at strikes this year while missing more of those strikes while also producing much less power when connecting.

The easy narrative produced here is that Jones is trying to cover more of the strike zone and, in doing so, is either not being selective enough in the pitches he is swinging at to produce solid power or that he has changed his swing mechanics in a way where his power is not as efficiently transferred to the ball.  What may challenge that narrative is that Jones is swing at fewer first pitches (35% in 2013 vs. 38% in 2012) while pitchers have thrown more first pitch strikes (55% in 2013 vs 51% in 2012).  It may be that him being more patient on the first pitch has resulted in him finding himself in the hole more often.  I doubt though that the 4% difference (which amounts to having about 20 more first pitch strikes over the first 405 PA as compared to last year) would explain such a large difference in ISO.

The answer is somewhat unclear to me, but it does seem obvious that Jones’ approach at the plate this year is to be more willing to swing at pitches for whatever reason.  It is also apparent that when he makes contact with those pitches that he has produced less than he did last year.  Maybe last year was a remarkably unique season for him and it is unfair of me to compare him to what may have been his career season.  Although possibly quite unfair as it might be, that season is somewhat what he needs to do in order for the team to get back in production for what they are paying him over the life of his extension.  Otherwise, we might be in for a lot of griping about his performance in a similar way to which Baltimore has thought about Nick Markakis’ contract.

The post Adam Jones Strike at History appeared first on Baltimore Sports and Life.

With this issue of the series, we move into the early 2000s with a failed Syd Thrift deal and two failed Jim Beattie deals.  In these three deals, Erik Bedard was supposedly desired in each of them.  In fact, they were all rather pitcher heavy, which makes sense because that was where the Orioles had “strength” in their thin minor league system during this time.

Deal #1 (Baltimore Sun)

Orioles receive 3B Scott Rolen, P Chris Brock, INF Kevin Jordan, and P Alfredo Simon

Phillies receive P Sidney Ponson, P Buddy Groom, P Erik Bedard, P Sean Douglass, and LF Jeff Conine

During the winter meetings in 2001, this deal appeared to be near completed.  Scott Rolen was one of the best players in the Major Leagues.  He was a very good hitter with an excellent glove.  He was also coming to the end of his team controlled years and the Phillies had no interest in committing major money to him over the ten season deal he was said to want.  At that point and time, the organization was far more conservative with their payroll than they are now.  They also thought that they needed to bolster their pitching and that guys like Pat Burrell, Bobby Abreu, and Travis Lee could take them far enough with the bats.  The main targets in this package were Sidney Ponson and Buddy Groom with Bedard and Douglass as high upside minor league arms (or as high upside as was available on the Orioles).

The Orioles on the other hand had an opening at third when Cal Ripken Jr. decided to retire.  In 2001, the team claimed Tony Batista as a potential replacement for Ripken, but his play was unimpressive.  Rolen would give the team a face, a true All Star.  However, this deal required the team to sign Rolen to an extension.  The year before, it was mentioned in the press that Mussina was let go because he would not sign for an amount that was sensitive to the media market in which the Orioles existed.  Perhaps likewise, Rolen desired a full market deal, which was as disagreeable to the Baltimore ownership as it was to the Philadelphia ownership.  The deal collapsed and was minimized to one where Chris Brock made his journey to the Orioles while the Phillies acquired John Wasdin.  From blockbuster to journeyman switcheroo.

Evaluation of the Orioles proposed package

Scott Rolen

Rolen wound up signing an 8 year, 90 MM deal with the St. Louis Cardinals after the 2002 season.  It was mentioned that he took less due to his adoration of the baseball culture around St. Louis than he was willing to take with Philadelphia or Baltimore.  The Cardinals bet on this as they did not make him sign as a requirement of the trade, which was something Baltimore was unwilling to do.  What the Cardinals got was an excellent player with an MVP quality season for almost half of the contract until injuries started impacting his performance.  Eventually, Rolen was dealt to the Blue Jays in a challenge deal for Troy Glaus.  That deal seemed pretty even until injuries destroyed Glaus’ career.

The rest of the package is underwhelming.  Kevin Jordan never played in an MLB game afterward.  Chris Brock did make his way to Baltimore, but was a typical journeyman reliever.  Alfredo Simon was heavily impacted by injuries until resurrecting his career a decade later in Baltimore and then taking it to the next level as a reliever with the Cincinnati Reds.

Evaluation of the Phillies Package

The Phillies wound up 21.5 games behind the NL East leading Atlanta Braves in 2002 and 15 out behind them in 2003, so it is probably safe to say that Sidney Ponson’s two year run of being a solid 2/3 starter and Buddy Groom’s 2002 270 ERA+ would have not helped them as much as they needed.  The real get for them would have been Erik Bedard, who put in amazing seasons in 2006 and 2007 before injuries got hold of him.

Trade #2 (Baltimore Sun)

Orioles receive 1B Derrek Lee

Marlins receive P Erik Bedard, P John Maine, and 3B Tripper Johnson

As the 2003 season wound down, first base was a bit of a mess for the Orioles.  After Jeff Conine (a marginal 1B) was dealt to the Marlins for their playoff run, it became apparent that B.J. Surhoff, David Segui, Jay Gibbons, nor Carlos Mendez were solutions.  Derrek Lee became the main target they decided to focus on.  He showed himself as a true middle of the order hitter and played at a position where the Orioles truly had no MLB quality option in their organization.

For the Marlins, after winning their second World Series, they decided a need to retool.  It has been a strategy that has made their ownership a good bit of profits, angered much of baseball, and has actually been relatively successful.  They tend to acquire good young talent, acquire a couple decent pieces when the youth have progressed to open a window of competition, and then sell most of their pieces while they still have value in order to restart the youth movement.  Most folks do not like how sausage is made when the process is made relatively transparent, but most folks love the taste of sausage.  To put it another way, the Marlins built a franchise during the 2000s that had the 14th best record overall with a winning percentage of .502.  That is a successful organization.  Anyway, it meant Lee was to be let go and a package of prospects be acquired that would catapult the Marlins toward another playoff run.

The Marlins and Orioles agreed upon a deal, which was contingent on an extension.  Supposedly, the club would not budge off of a 3 year, 18 MM deal after including so many prospects.  The deal collapsed on that and the team decided to focus their plans for first base on bringing back Rafael Palmeiro.  The Marlins went to their second favorite package, quickly dealing him to the Cubs.  The Cubs signed Lee to a 3 year, 21 MM deal.

Derrek Lee

The three year deal the Cubs signed him to was scrapped after his second season when he established himself as one of the best players in baseball.  This resulted in the third year being overwritten with a new 5 year, 65 MM contract.  Lee then proceeded to one good season, one very good season, and three slightly below average seasons.  He was somewhat underwhelming as the Cubs needed him to perform at a high level each season.  It would be hard to see whether or not Lee would have greatly changed the Orioles’ future.  You could argue that simply replacing Palmeiro with Lee in 2005 that the team would have gone 82-80 instead of 74-88.  I’m not sure where the would get them outside of one grand benefit — never having to hear someone complain that the team took Billy Rowell over Tim Lincecum in the 2006 draft.

Evaluation of the Marlins Package

Two things come to mind: (1) Erik Bedard was popular and (2) the Marlins would have preferred this package over what the Cubs gave them.

Erik Bedard

It is somewhat amazing to look back at what Bedard had accomplished for the Orioles and how it netted them, eventually, Adam Jones, Chris Tillman, George Sherrill, Kam Mickolio, and Tony Butler.  A few broken seasons for three useful starters.

John Maine

Maine would have given the Marlins a second useful piece in their rotation for a few years until his arm injuries caught up to him.  Unlike Bedard though, Maine was later packaged with Jorge Julio and dealt to the Mets for the eternally underwhelming Kris Benson.

The final piece of the deal was Tripper Johnson who was a sleeper hot corner prospect with a decent swing and athleticism.  He was a typical kind of throw-in that the Marlins were (and still are) looking for.  He wound up staying in the Orioles’ organization and never advanced past AA where he had a full season and a cup of coffee.  He retired after spending one season, at age 25, with the Pirates organization.  He then played a lot of secondary, rather poorly, for the Washington Huskies in an 0-12 season and then played out his collegiate career as a special teams man.

Trade #3 (ESPN)

Orioles receive P Tim Hudson

Athletics receive P John Maine, P Hayden Penn, and P Erik Bedard

A year later, the Orioles changed their focus to pitching.  The brass was very interested in the demolition of Beane’s early 2000 Oakland A powerhouse.  Beane was also pretty impressed by some of the arms in the Orioles’ system.  Both sides agreed on the above deal, but things fell apart allegedly when Tim Hudson refused to sign an extension with the club.  The Orioles were concerned about leveraging themselves so greatly without an extension as a safety net, so the Athletics moved on to the next suitor.

Tim Hudson

It is actually pretty hard to believe these days that Tim Hudson has spent three more years pitching for the Braves than he did for the Athletics. He would have been a good addition to the Orioles’ staff, but to what end?  During this part of the Orioles’ time in the wilderness, there was great hope that Daniel Cabrera, Sidney Ponson, and Rodrigo Lopez would be able to buoy the rotation with Hudson as the ace.  The offense was supposed to be led by Tejada and Roberts with significant contributions from Javy Lopez, Sammy Sosa, a hopefully rejuvenated tandem in Luis Matos and Larry Bigbie, and with Jay Gibbons as a designated hitter.  Back then, it looked like it just might work, but it meant that about a dozen things had to go right.  Only, maybe, three of them actually worked out.

Something similar could be said about the Athletics.  Hudson eventually went to the Braves for Juan Cruz, Dan Meyer, and Charles Thomas.  Juan Cruz turned into one poor year of Brad Halsey.  Nothing turned out well for the other two.  Dan Meyer may ring a bell to some of you out there.  Last fall, the Orioles picked him up.  He was released at the end of Spring Training.

Conclusion

It is amazing that of the three famous non-Bedard deals that this one likely would have been the best for the team if they could have signed him to an extension.  Still, I would have to state that the final Bedard deal was the one that worked out best for the club.  The other deals above would have netted the team players who probably would not have had the necessary complementary pieces for making this team competitive.  Essentially, all available money would have been tied up in these stars and the team would then be heavily reliant on a thin minor league that just went up and dealt their best pieces.  Bad teams tend not to get better by dealing for a great player unless that move is matched with a deluge of cash to pick up additional players on the market.

The post Deals that Never Happened, Part III appeared first on Baltimore Sports and Life.

Deal #1 (LA Times / Sporting News)

Winter 1997

Orioles receive RF Shawn Green

Blue Jays receive COF Jeffrey Hammonds

As I understand how this all transpired, one of the first moves Frank Wren considered when he took the mantle from Pat Gillick was dealing promising corner outfielder Jeffrey Hammonds for equally promising Shawn Green.  It was essentially one of those old challenge trades.  Hammonds was a toolsy player who excelled when healthy.  Shawn Green was a prototypical right fielder who was more value for his power potential than the reality that he also had some great tools as well.

As mentioned in the previous post in this series, this deal hit the brakes supposedly when it went to Angelos’ desk as he wish to develop Hammonds as his own home grown talent.  Half a season later, Hammonds had not broken out and the Orioles dealt him for Willie Greene who had shown a decent bat, but completely fell apart.  The Orioles wound up releasing Greene after that half season while Hammonds put in useful seasons for the next three or four years.

What about the other side?

Shawn Green

Eight seasons.  This deal would have resolved right field for eight years.  Where the Burnitz deal was understandably a poor deal as Bonilla wound up being quite useful in the Orioles run to the playoffs, this one could have greatly changed the Orioles’ history.  Green monster 1999 to 2002 run may have enabled the team to have been more flexible in acquiring talent.  It may have opened up the front office to find useful young talent instead of having to hit up retreads.

Of course, to think Green alone would have kept this franchise from reaching the bottom of the barrel is a bit naive.  The late 90s an early 00s led this team into a dark time with respect to how the organization was being run.  Perhaps more faith in Wren could have changed things, but perhaps not.

Deal #2 (Seattle Times)

2000

Orioles agreed to terms with Aaron Sele (4y/29MM) pending a medical exam.

So the story goes that Angelos’ front office took medical exams much more seriously after Xavier Hernandez signed a contract with the Orioles on a 2 year, 2.5 MM contract, but he wound up having a tear in his rotator cuff.  Sele’s shoulder looked rough and Angelos rescinded the contract.  Sele wound up signing a 2 year deal with the Mariners for 15 MM.

Aaron Sele

The Mariners wound up doing pretty well getting five bWAR over two years.  The Angels though wound up getting the short end as they signed Sele to a three year deal that saw him as a below replacement level pitcher (-0.3 bWAR).  So, Angelos decision wound up be the accurate one.  I am not sure the thought process was especially accurate, but you cannot argue with his concern about the medical report and Sele winding up hurting that shoulder during what would have been the third year of the Orioles’ contract.  Additionally, one has to wonder why the best deal Sele could get was a two year deal with the Mariners.

Conclusion on the Second Part of this Series

What is interesting about the moves we have heard Angelos being involved in is that he supposedly was accurate a great deal of the time.  Is this him being a reasonably intelligent man using logic or may it be him having the wrong people in control?  Maybe it is something else.  So far we have gone through five deals and really only the Shawn Green one looks like a slam dunk in retrospect.

The post Deals That Never Happened: Part II appeared first on Baltimore Sports and Life.

(You can discuss this on the BSL Board here.)

Trade #1 (Baltimore Sun)

Orioles receive catcher Chris Widger and top 100 infield prospect Desi Relaford

Mariners receive starting pitcher David Wells

In Pat Gillick’s first year, he found the club 10 games behind the first place Yankees and seven games behind the wild card leading Chicago White Sox at the deadline.  From his perspective, the team would benefit from getting rid of impending free agent veterans in exchange for promising young players for the team to rely upon in the future.  David Wells had been pretty unspectacular for the team with a 7-10 record and a 4.75 ERA.  He still had value though for many teams who remembered him as a potential ace with the Tigers and Reds.  Seattle, gearing up for their playoff run offered a promising catching prospect in Chris Widger and a top 100 SS prospect in Desi Relaford.

The Orioles were looking for pieces to replace two major upcoming holes in their roster: catcher and shortstop.  The team’s current catcher, Chris Hoiles, was beginning to wear down.  His bat was still excellent, one of the best bats ever for a catcher, but his defense was sliding rapidly.  The team needed a promising transition.  Likewise, Cal Ripken Jr. was beginning to struggle at shortstop and also likely needed someone who could push him to third base.  Gillick believed that Widger was one of the best catching prospects in baseball and was likely to become an All Star.  Desi Relaford?  The majority of scouting reports available from that time were pretty flowery about his defense as well as the potential for his offense.

However, the deal did not happen because Angelos allegedly thought that the fans deserved the best team he could provide.  Wells proceeded to go 4-4 (overall the team went 7-6 in his starts) while tossing a couple gems and getting shelled several times.  One could make an argument that Wells provided nothing for the playoff run other than, on average, replacement level pitching.  Though that might be too harsh.  The Orioles 6th starter (after dealing a largely ineffective Kent Mercker for Eddie Murray) was Jimmy Haynes who carried a 8.29 ERA over 89 innings that year.  And, well, the Orioles did wind up making the playoffs.

Wells left after the season to play for the New York Yankees, but secured the Orioles the Yankees first selection as well as a supplementary draft pick.  With those picks the Orioles selected promising OF prospect Darnell McDonald (who wound up with some cups of coffee in the majors, but no significant impact) and OF Ntema Ndungidi (who could rake in A ball, but could never figure out pitchers in AA).

So how did the two prospects fair?

Chris Widger

It took ten years for Widger to finally show up in an Orioles uniform at the age of 25.  During his career, he found himself as a sometimes platoon, sometimes full-time catcher for Dan Duquette’s Montreal Expos where he displayed decent receiving skills and a below average bat.  After his age 29 season, he split time in the minors interspersed with a opportunities in the Majors.  In all, this was not the catcher that Pat Gillick was looking for.

Desi Relaford

For a below replacement value career (-0.6 bWAR), Desi Relaford was able to find a lot of work.  His defense was adequate, never great.  He also never really figured out how to get on base enough to take advantage of his base running skills outside of 2000 and 2001.  Ripken’s actual replacement, Mike Bordick, wound up being superior in every way to Relaford further suggesting that the genius of Pat Gillick is not about the young players he acquires, but his incredible ability to recognize talent in Major Leaguers.  Relaford was still dealt though by the Mariners who were able to acquire the Phillies’ Terry Muhlholland who pitched slightly better than David Wells over the last few months of the season, so a short term win for all.  Widger wound up in a deal that was essentially him for Jeff Fassero after the 1996 season.  Fassero wound up giving the Mariners two excellent seasons as a starting pitcher before injuries derailed him and forced him to reemerge as a relief arm.

Trade #2 (Baltimore Sun)

Orioles receive relief pitcher Bryce Florie and top SS prospect Juan Melo

Padres receive 3B/LF Bobby Bonilla

As with the nixed Wells deal above, this deal was being cemented in the same context.  Like Wells, Bonilla was underperforming and just barely crested an 800 OPS on the final day to deal a player.  Gillick had two solid deals in place (I will discuss the other one next).  In the one with the Padres, he was angling for reliever Bryce Florie and well regarded SS prospect Juan Melo.  Florie was a promising starting pitcher who developed wildness late in his minor league career.  He had been able to subdue his wildness with a change to the bullpen and was enjoying his second season in that role for the Padres.   Melo was a top 50 prospect and one the best SS prospects at that time.  As with Wells, Angelos allegedly nixed this deal in consideration for the fans.

Where the Wells deal being nixed arguably was of little consequence, this nixed deal was incredibly important to the Orioles.  Bonilla was sitting at an 805 OPS on August 1st.  He proceeded to deliver a 964 OPS in August and a 918 OPS in September.  You could argue that there would have been no playoff comeback for the Orioles without Bonilla’s bat in the lineup.  The Orioles did not qualify Bonilla as someone worth compensation and he departed the dream Florida Marlin team of 1997.  Like before, the players that would have come back to the Orioles did not wind up incredibly sterling.

Bryce Florie

Florie represented someone who could have beefed up the Orioles’ excellent pen, which was a concern because so much depended on 33 year old Randy Myers, 35 year old Roger McDowell, and 39 year old Jesse Orosco.  Florie also represented a potential spot starter, which the Tigers wound up exploring with in 1998 and 1999 with varying success.  He did not stay long with the Padres as they moved on from Bobby Bonilla to a deal involving the Brewers Greg Vaughn who wound up 78 home runs for them over 311 games.  Eventually, he was dealt to Dan Duquette’s Red Sox for Mike Maroth and was a serviceable member of their bullpen for a couple years.

Juan Melo

Melo wound up being an incredibly faded pale image of Relaford.  The promising offensive output by the defense oriented Melo as a 19 year old in HiA simply did not turn into more campaigns with a high batting average.  His defense also did not improve as much as many scouts thought it would.  He wound up on one more top 100 scouting list and then everyone seemed to divert their gaze.  By 1999, the Padres gave up on him and dealt him to the Toronto Blue Jays for a 25 year old AA pitcher named Isabel Giron who was not considered much of a prospect at the time.  Eventually, he found himself in the Majors with the Giants in 2000 where he logged 13 plate appearances and then went back into the shadows.

Trade 3: (Baltimore Sun)

Orioles receive Jeremy Burnitz, Eddie Murray, and Albie Lopez

Indians receive Bobby Bonilla and Jeffrey Hammonds

This was a blockbuster by every sense of the word.  Bonilla was a big name and Hammonds (two years from his ranking as the third best prospect in baseball) was considered a potential star in the making as long as he could remain healthy.  Yes, some of the shine had worn off of Hammonds, but there were still a great many believers in his talent.  Burnitz was an older prospect who was once considered a solid power prospect, but had difficulty finding success at the Major League level.  Murray would have been a steady veteran presence the team was thought to need to solidify the DH position.  Murray’s 1996 season to date was pretty poor, but he only the year before did he crush the ball for the Indians.  Lopez was a top pitching prospect in the Indians system who, like Burnitz, was having trouble breaking out in the Majors.  So, looking at the entire package, this appears to be an attempt by Gillick to appease a need to compete now, but also prepare for the future.

The supposed issue though was that Indians really were enamored with Jeffrey Hammonds’ potential and Angelos greatly desired a home grown positional prospect to take on the face of the organization.  It was supposedly similar to when Angelos allegedly nixed deals involving Brian Roberts.  So, as mentioned above, the Orioles did not deal Bonilla and Hammonds.  Burnitz wound up sputtering with the team he was actually traded to, the Brewers.  Eddie Murray wound up on the team and did probably far worse than you remember.  Lopez wound up doing pretty poorly for the Indians down the stretch.

A rundown of the non-Bonillas.

Jeffrey Hammonds

Was Hammonds a great player?  No, but he was an above average player in 1997 and a major reason why that team went to the playoffs.  He also put in a good, but not great 1998 season.  However, the team had grown tired of his injuries and decided to cash in on him for a look on RF Willie Greene.  Greene was let go after the season and was quickly out of baseball within two years.  Hammonds proceeded to do well for the Reds who mistakenly turned him into Dante Bichette who then Dan Duquette acquired for Chris Rietsma.  Hammonds then did well enough to earn a trip to the 2000 All Star game representing the Rockies and enjoyed some marginal success into his early 30s.

Jeromy Burnitz

Yes, Jeromy Burnitz was a monster for the Milwaukee Brewers and would likely have made the 1997 Orioles (as well as the 1998-2001 Orioles) a better team.  Who knows…Burnitz crushing the ball in RF for the O’s maybe would have resulted in the team not making a deal for Albert Belle.

The Indians, having missed on Bonilla, traded Burnitz (who was raking for the Tribe) to the Brewers for Kevin Seitzer who wound up delivering a 160 OPS+ and then basically nothing more after that season.  It should also be mentioned that Jeromy Burntiz wound up being pretty awful down the stretch, so he would not have helped the 1996 Orioles much in making the playoffs.

Eddie Murray

Murray was a great story in 1996.  I remember with great fondness that he hit his 500th home run in an Orioles jersey.  That said, he was a pretty poor DH.  Kent Mercker, the player the team traded him for, had done pretty poorly with the team and could not rekindle his performance during his time in Atlanta…until he was dealt to the Indians who only used him in a relief role similar to his role during his more successful years in Atlanta.

Albie Lopez