The 2015 season will long be remembered as “The Start”. This was the year that the influx of young, dynamic talent came to the Major Leagues and made a difference. Kris Bryant, Carlos Correa, Kyle Schwarber, Francisco Lindor, Miguel Sano, Corey Seager, Carlos Rodon, Noah Syndergaard, Lance McCullers, Luis Severino, and Andrew Heaney were just a sampling of a great rookie crop. That doesn’t even include the stellar performances by second and third year players like Mookie Betts, George Springer, Jacob deGrom, Dellin Betances, Carlos Martinez, and Yordano Ventura.
Obviously, the next generation of baseball stars is already here and already making an impact. It’s as if the baseball industry has decided to promote its best players to the Major Leagues, instead of adhering to the old development clocks which required players to develop in the Minor Leagues until the player reached his mid-20’s. Instead, the industry, as a whole, correctly decided to put talent first and then allow players to develop at the Major League level. Even long standing pitching practices were pushed, as the Mets rode a young staff past innings caps to the World Series.
{Discuss Kevin Gausman and the Orioles on the BSL Boards}
To some degree, the Baltimore Orioles were ahead of the curve when they promoted a raw, not-quite-ready-for-the Major Leagues Manny Machado back in 2012. Machado was 19 years old at the time and clearly had some developing to do. Three years later, Machado is an MVP candidate and one of the handful of players who can legitimately lay claim to the title of “Best All Around Player” in the sport. He just finished his age 22 season with a .286/.359/.502 with 35 home runs and 20 stolen bases. And, he happens to play elite level defense too.
But, that was three seasons ago, during the Orioles surprise run to the playoffs. Yet, Dan Duquette showed some vision by going against conventional wisdom and standard practice to promote the organization’s best player. Duquette decided to see what he had in a young talent, rather than trot out a replacement level player at third base. He decided to see what he had in his intriguing talent.
That seems so long ago.
This past season, the Orioles disappointed, finishing at 81-81, good enough for just third place in the American League East. While the Orioles did rally to post that .500 season and extend their run of four consecutive .500 or better seasons, the organization missed an opportunity to capitalize on Machado’s breakout season, Chris Davis’ rebound season, another solid Adam Jones season, and an elite level performance from the bullpen (MLB best 6.3 WAR value).
There is plenty of blame to go around for the Orioles’ 2015 failures. The defense finished with the 10th worst defensive runs saved mark. The offense ranked just 12th in the American League in on base percentage, severely minimizing its tremendous home run power, which produced the third most round-trippers in the American League. And, obviously, the rotation was the biggest culprit, ranking just 11th in the AL according to WAR, 14th according to FIP, and 11th in walk rate. The rotation’s failures can really be blamed on regression, as those poor periphery numbers that they seemingly avoided for the past two seasons came back to haunt them.
That last point, however, isn’t the fault of the players. It is the direct responsibility of the organization for failing to upgrade a staff whose success certainly looked unsustainable and proved to be just that in 2015. That’s where the lack of foresight sabotaged the team. The biggest issue of it all is the fact that Duquette and Manager Buck Showalter may have had an answer sitting on their roster. And, because they failed to utilize him properly, they have somewhat sabotaged his 2016 season as well.
Instead of putting their best players on the Major League roster in a full time role–like they did with Machado in 2012–Duquette and the Orioles wasted Kevin Gausman, their 24 year old right hander, whose stuff looks to be the best in the organization. The Orioles’ handling of the hard throwing right hander was curious from Spring Training to the last day of the season. The organization failed to maximize an asset.
At, the very least, the Orioles failed to see if they have a major asset.
Consider that the Orioles gave 45 starts to the combination of Miguel Gonzalez (5.01 FIP), Bud Norris (5.64 FIP), and Mike Wright (6.14 FIP). Meanwhile, Kevin Gausman had to wait until July 2nd to become a regular member of the rotation. The organization gave its hardest throwing starter–he of the 95 MPH fastball variety–just 17 starts all season.
In his 17 starts, Gausman pitched 100.1 innings, allowed 98 hits and 24 walks, while striking out 90 batters. His 4.06 FIP isn’t spectacular, but it is almost a full run better than Gonzalez’s mark and light years ahead of Norris and Wright. Even more encouraging is his developing strikeout ability. As a starter, Gausman posted a 21.5 percent strikeout percentage, an improvement from his 18.5 percent mark in 2014. He also demonstrated better control, posting a 5.7 percent walk rate, a great improvement of the 8 percent walk rate of 2014. For the third consecutive season, Gausman lowered his hard hit and medium hit rates and raised his ground ball rate. All signs point to an above average pitcher who possesses top of the rotation stuff.
In fairness, Gausman’s shortcoming is of importance. Despite all of the strikeout ability and the improving peripherals, he allowed 15 home runs as a starter. That total is alarming, but it should be noted that front line starters such as Felix Hernandez, Corey Kluber, Max Scherzer, and Chris Sale all gave up more than 23 home runs. With a full season projection of 30 home runs allowed, Gausman would be on the dangerously high side, but he wouldn’t be that far out of line with some of the other top pitchers in the game. Even that home run total could be misleading, as Gausman wasn’t given a regular role until late in the season, after being yanked in an out of the rotation and spending time on the disabled list. During his last 30 innings pitched–all as a starter–he gave up just three home runs.
Perhaps the biggest red flag on Gausman was that he also gave up 26 doubles and one triple during his starts, making it a combined 42 hits that went for extra bases. It’s a total that definitely raises an eyebrow. A pitcher with a 95 MPH fastball and one that elicits swings and misses with pitches in the strike zone at a 16 percent rate shouldn’t give up that many extra base hits. With a stable FIP, a somewhat pedestrian .289 BABIP, and low hard hit rates, the extra base hits are somewhat perplexing. Without a larger sample size to lean on, the idea that Gausman gives up too many extra base hits to be effective is unproven. It’s pause for concern, but it is something that shouldn’t stop the Orioles for giving him a full time job. Yet, because the Orioles haven’t given him a full season yet, it can’t be determined if this is, indeed, a problem.
That pretty much encapsulates the Orioles’ handling of Gausman. While it is somewhat understandable that Gausman wouldn’t open the 2015 season in the rotation because of economics–the Orioles had a lot invested in Ubaldo Jimenez and, to a lesser degree, Bud Norris–there is no excuse for waiting to make a change. Once Norris and Gonzalez proved they weren’t going to be able to repeat their 2014 season, the move to Gausman should’ve happened. Gausman did spend time on the disabled list due to shoulder tendinitis, perhaps due to the shifting between the bullpen and the rotation, but even when he came back, he was a spot starter, rumored to being shopped in trades, and put in the bullpen before getting a permanent spot after the All-Star Break. In many ways, 2015 was a lost season for a pitcher who should be at the beginning stages of his prime years.
The curious handling of Kevin Gausman impacts an important 2016 season. While it shouldn’t be a discussion of whether or not Gausman will be in the rotation for 2016–he should be a lock–the Orioles will have to manage his workload. In total, Gausman pitched 112.1 innings at the Major League level. He added another 22.1 innings in the Minor Leagues, giving him a 2015 total of 134.2 innings. That total is actually 23 innings less than he pitched in 2014. So, by limiting his workload early, Gausman’s innings load regressed. If the organization follows the norm in terms of additional innings, Gausman is slated to pitch around 175 innings. If they had given him a spot in the rotation earlier in the season, he likely would’ve entered 2016 without any worry about innings limits. Now, the Orioles will have to monitor the pitcher who most likely will be their best in the rotation.
Most likely.
That’s the problem. Despite parts of three seasons in the Major Leagues and entering his age 25 season, Kevin Gausman is still largely an unknown. It isn’t known how he’ll fair over the course of an entire season. It isn’t known if he is capable of being consistent. It isn’t known if he has truly evolved into a high strikeout, low walk pitcher. It isn’t known if the results will match that promise. It isn’t known if he’s capable of leading a rotation or being a solid contributor. It isn’t known whether or not if he is prone to giving up extra base hits.
It isn’t known because the Orioles failed to give an opportunity. It is a severe miscalculation by an organization that is in desperate need of a top of the rotation starter and an organization that has a history of not being willing to pay for one.
Perhaps, there is a reason for it. Maybe the Orioles simply don’t believe Kevin Gausman is that guy. If he were, wouldn’t they have plugged him into the rotation like the Yankees plugged in Luis Severino? Or, wouldn’t they use him like the Mets have used their four young starters? There is the possibility that despite all of the statistics and radar gun readings, that the Orioles don’t believe Kevin Gausman is the answer for their rotation issues. Why else would below league average starters get 28 more starts than him?
He certainly produced better in his 17 starts.
As the Orioles enter a winter with many questions to answer, ranging from who fills out the rotation to whether or not to offer contracts and qualifying offers to their own free agents, they still have the uncertainty of what they have in a young, 25 year old power pitcher. While the potential for positive results seems likely, this was an unknown that could have and should have been avoided. The organization needed to field its top talent in the right spots from day one. If they did, they could plan the offseason knowing whether or not Gausman is a top of the rotation starter or merely a frustrating pitcher with great stuff who gets mediocre results.
Instead, Dan Duquette will have to complete rotation that contains the enigma that is Ubaldo Jimenez, Chris Tillman, and an unproven Gausman without having an idea of the type of production he will get from anyone. It’s an imprecise and inefficient way of building.
More importantly, the Orioles curious handling of Kevin Gausman has stunted his growth.

Orioles Analyst
First and foremost, a Father. After that, I am a writer and teacher who not only started my own company and published an i-magazine as well as a newsletter, but have been published by USA Today, Operation Sports, Baseball Prospectus, Baseball Digest, Gotham Baseball Magazine, and numerous other publications. As an educator, I have 20 years of classroom experience and am utilizing that experience in my current position as department coordinator. Wrote the book The Teacher And The Admin (https://theteacherandtheadmin.com/the-book/) and operate that website which is dedicated to making education better for kids.