State of the Bats

First, let’s quickly investigate the lineup. The Orioles have basically played to a 50th-percentile outcome which is a fancy way of saying they’ve neither been lucky nor unlucky. Some guys have done more than expected. Others underperformed. One particularly nasty spot in the lineup is second base, which, if resolved, could thrust the offense from league average (98 wRC+) to solidly above average. That’s the idea, indirectly, behind signing a shortstop.

Avoiding multiple months of Robinson Chirinos as the primary backstop will help too. Hence why we already have rumors of the Orioles targeting a high-quality backup to Adley Rutschman. That’s a topic for another day.

The Market

Four major shortstops are headed for the open market – Trea Turner, Carlos Correa, Xander Bogaerts, and Dansby Swanson. By Wins Above Replacement (WAR), Bogaerts, Turner, and Swanson are tied with roughly 6 WAR this season. Swanson’s history of performance at this level is much shorter than the others. It might not feel like it, but Correa is actually the youngest of the bunch. He struggled earlier in the season but has come on spicy-hot of late. They all project for between four and five wins in 2023. Rougned Odor has 0.2 WAR. If the 2022 Orioles had one of these players (using their projected output rather than actual), they’d be in the thick of the Wild Card race with roughly 80 wins.

Baltimore has flexibility since Gunnar Henderson can play any of the infield positions. That means they can also consider Nolan Arenado. He’s almost certain to opt out of his existing contract. If the club fails, they can consider Jean Segura, Whit Merrifield, and Justin Turner ($16MM club option) as flawed consolation prizes. Segura has a $17MM club option many assume will be declined (I think the Phillies would have to be nuts to do so). Tim Anderson has a $12.5MM club option everyone assumes will be triggered. I’m among “everyone.” Ditto Kolten Wong at $10MM. Jose Iglesias, Elvis Andrus, Adam Frazier, Brandon Drury, Donovan Solano, and Jace Peterson would be disappointing “upgrades.”

The trade market for established middle infielders and third basemen doesn’t appear to be particularly robust. It’s possible The Cubs, Brewers, Rangers, Padres, or Guardians could be persuaded to trade Nico Hoerner, Willy Adames, Corey Seager, Marcus Semien, Ha-seong Kim, or Amed Rosario. Unlikely, but possible.

Cost

These are all players looking for yearly salaries north of $30MM. For context, Corey Seager signed a 10-year, $325MM deal with the Rangers last winter as a 27-year-old. Turner, Correa, and Arenado will be looking for better AAVs. Swanson might find himself closer to the seven-year, $175MM deal signed by Marcus Semien, though he should locate either a longer term or better AAV. Arenado is the oldest of the bunch and will probably want to convert his remaining five years and $144MM into something closer to seven years and $250MM.

Of course, players can want whatever they want. Orgs have their own ideas of what these players should earn. That’s why it’s rare for major free agents to sign quickly. It usually only happens when an unexpected suitor decides they need to break the bank before other teams can digest the implications. Like the Rangers did last winter, though that was also a special case given the looming labor stoppage.

Hungry Rivals

In short, four players qualify as a Plan A target with Swanson more of a Plan B addition. After that, you’re starting to consider other pathways to upgrade the roster. How many teams might be fighting for this talent? Let’s explore.

Baltimore Orioles: As we know, the hometown heroes have virtually no commitments on the books. They could add three superstars at market price and still run a league-average payroll.

Los Angeles Dodgers: With revenues in the neighborhood of $600MM, there’s virtually no constraint on the Dodgers payroll. If they decide they shall sign a member of this shortstop class, they will do so. It’s odd that they haven’t extended Turner – perhaps a sign they prefer a younger option like Correa.

New York Yankees: The imminent arrival of Anthony Volpe with Oswaldo Peraza available as a stopgap means the Yankees don’t need a shortstop. Like the Dodgers, they have revenues in the area of $600MM. They’re an obvious threat to sign Arenado. The shortstops might act as a backup to that plan. Their books are distressingly clean for 2023 and beyond.

Boston Red Sox: With Xander Bogaerts headed out the door, Boston is in a weird spot. They could ask Trevor Story to resume shortstopping, but his elbow issues leave him better-suited for the keystone. They’ll have money to spend, but they’ve been pretty thrifty under Chaim Bloom.

Philadelphia Phillies: Though far more constrained than the Yankees and Dodgers, the Phillies spend aggressively. Their revenues are more in the $400MM range. They have room to add a large contract, and there’s a distinct chance they’ll deal one of Nick Castellanos or Kyle Schwarber in order to better balance the roster. A premium shortstop anchor lets the club call Bryson Stott “depth” – assuming they also keep Segura, Alec Bohm, and Rhys Hoskins – none of which is certain. They might break in the direction of Aaron Judge instead.

Detroit Tigers: Long-rumored as suitors for Correa, the Tigers might take the lesson of 2022 and decide the answer is a steadier star infielder than Javy Baez. They’ve got plenty of room for both and a payroll mostly composed of pre-arb players. They’ve been bad for so long that a winning season could pay for one of these shortstops at once just in revenue growth alone.

San Francisco Giants: The Giants revenue is similar to the Phillies, and they may want to finally move on from Brandon Crawford. Or at least reduce his role. They have a massive capacity for spending based on their 2023 commitments. Virtually nothing is on the books for 2024.

Dark Horses

Minnesota Twins: Hey! They did it once. They could do it again. They have the money in 2023, but they lack the appetite for long deals that could sink future contending rosters.

Los Angeles Angels: A new owner might look at their infield and decide to invest $150MM per year. After all, this is a club with the same market as the Dodgers and little more than half the revenue. Guggenheim Capital Management invested in the Dodgers to bring them to where they are today. It’s a fair roadmap for a deep-pocketed investor – and possibly why a Shohei Ohtani trade was nixed at the outset.

Seattle Mariners: The Mariners like J.P. Crawford and seem committed to him. But second and third base are areas where they could spend money to upgrade more efficiently than other areas of the roster. Eugenio Suarez can bounce around first, third, and designated hitter. They also might save their wad for future offseasons.

Atlanta Braves: The Braves seemingly only spend substantial money on internal players – including those they first acquire via trade or one-year free agent deal. The success of Vaughn Grissom means the club will likely enter 2023 with a Grissom-Albies middle infield. Remember, Albies came up as a shortstop so they have options.

Houston Astros: They could upgrade from Jeremy Pena, but it would be an inefficient move for a tightly constrained payroll.

Colorado Rockies: Nobody pretends to understand what they’re doing, least of all themselves. They should be planning for Ezequiel Tovar’s debut sometime in 2023.

Arizona Diamondbacks: Every so often, the Diamondbacks come out of nowhere to make a splash. Unless they like Geraldo Perdomo’s odds of improving (they aren’t terrible!), shortstop is the easiest spot in the lineup for them to upgrade. Then again, Jordan Lawlar will arrive in late 2023 or early 2024. A temporary patch would make more sense.

Final Tally

For the lazy among you, that’s seven clubs (including the O’s) among the likely suitors and another seven that could sneak into the picture. Let’s call it eight teams fighting for five players. Not bad odds!

The post The Shortstop Market and Suitors appeared first on Baltimore Sports and Life.

Austin Hays is a league-average player.

He has three “full” seasons in the Majors. If we prorate 2020 to 650 plate appearances, he would have posted 1.9 WAR. He had 2.2 WAR last season in 529 plate appearances – a pace of about 2.7 WAR over 650 plate appearances. This year, he’s at 1.4 WAR and a 650-plate appearance pace of 1.8 WAR. In 1,171 plate appearances over these last three seasons, he’s hitting .255/.308/.432 with 41 home runs, eight steals, a 5.5 percent walk rate, and a 20.1 percent strikeout rate.

For those who use Statcast, consider these images.

Blue is bad! In most respects, he trended the wrong way in 2022. That could mean he’s going to be a short-career guy or maybe he has a rebound on the way in 2023. Without a change in talent level, we can be confident expecting between 1.0 and 2.5 WAR per full season. That’s a fine player, even on a contending roster.

Consider this block of similar performers on playoff-bound clubs this season. The Dodgers have Cody Bellinger at 1.2 WAR in 486 plate appearances. The Padres squeezed a little more out of Trent Grisham and quite a bit less from Wil Myers. Astros part-time center fielder Chas McCormick is only a hair better than Hays. Myles Straw has been a terrible hitter for the Guardians since the first quarter of the season (with elite defense). The Blue Jays keep playing Raimel Tapia, and he’s flat-out terrible. The Rays have 415 plate appearances from -0.6 WAR Taylor Walls. The ghost of Josh Donaldson is pretty close to a Hays clone, and the Yankees have other strugglebuses too (remember Joey Gallo?). The Braves combo meal of Robbie Grossman, Adam Duvall, and Eddie Rosario barely has a pulse. The bottom half of the Mets lineup is piecemeal due to injuries. The Phillies spent most of the season trying to jumpstart Bryson Stott at shortstop. Meanwhile, center field is an ongoing disaster. The Cardinals… well, they’re quite good. Even so, Tyler O’Neill hasn’t been much better than Hays on a per-game basis.

Of course, in this day and age, a player isn’t doomed to remain the same. Even a decade ago, only a handful of players meaningfully changed their talent level from year-to-year. Statcast, biometric tools, and advances in “baseball science” have allowed anybody to transform themselves on a whim.

Hays has numerous pathways to improvement. A simple one is to work on increasing his average and maximum exit velocities. If you’ve noticed leaguewide exit velocities increasing, it’s because they are! Every season, more and more players set career-bests in barreled contact and max exit velocity. Hays is also below average with his swing decisions. Simply working to lay off one type of breaking ball outside of the strike zone could yield something like a five-point uptick in his wRC+. Then there are higher effort options – a new swing plane, wholesale adjustments to his plate discipline, or reporting to Spring Training in the “best shape of his life” could all yield better outcomes. He might also consider a shift in his approach in response to the deep left field at Camden Yards. There’s no question Hays is one of the most negatively affected players by the new dimensions.

Orioles Spin

From a planning perspective, the Orioles should continue to consider Hays a roughly league-average player. He has ways to become better but could just as easily slip into obscurity. The O’s brass knows more about his work ethic than I ever will.

It’s absolutely paramount that the Orioles improve the roster over the winter. The pitching staff has overachieved and needs to be reinforced just to replicate 2022. Obviously, replacing Rougned Odor is an important first step. Many observers (i.e. me) assume this will be accomplished by signing a shortstop or Nolan Arenado, thus pushing Jorge Mateo or Gunnar Henderson to the keystone. There are also numerous options filtering up through the minors.

Designated hitter and/or first base could take a nudge too. Ryan Mountcastle is an interesting young player who might need time (and a different venue) to fully realize his potential. He should be considered tradeable. A dedicated designated hitter is more of a nice-to-have, especially considering the minor league depth and Adley Rutschman’s valuable bat. That leaves the outfield where, presently, the in-house plan seems to be Anthony Santander, Cedric Mullins, and Hays with Kyle Stowers, Ryan McKenna, Terrin Vavra, and, eventually, Colton Cowser in reserve. A more impressive corner outfielder would be welcome – ideally, one who can fill a top-four spot in the lineup.

That needn’t come at the expense of Hays, at least not immediately. Even if a premium corner outfielder is acquired, Hays and Santander can bounce between a corner outfield slot and designated hitter with a few days lost to Rutschman until prospects force a different alignment.

What’s the market look like? Aaron Judge headlines an otherwise unimpressive group of free agent outfielders. Judge certainly has the power to ignore the left field wall. The next-best guy, arguably Mitch Haniger, does not. At that point, we’re talking about more league-average players. However, several of them are left-handed. Pure platoonmates like David Peralta or Tyler Naquin would fit any team’s budget and seemingly pair well with Hays. Joc Pederson and Michael Brantley (if healthy) are pricier variations of the same idea. Andrew Benintendi and Brandon Nimmo would work as full-time replacements. They’d also fill the leadoff role better than Mullins. However, I’m not sure Benintendi and Nimmo are enough of an upgrade on Hays to justify the expense. Joey Gallo’s out there too for anyone keen to reexperience Chris Davis. I happen to like Gallo, but the Orioles should be thinking high floor. Gallo’s a better fit for a team hoping to win the lottery.

On the trade front, it’s possible the Diamondbacks would consider swapping a young outfielder for a young infielder. Alek Thomas for Jordan Westburg and a second piece is plausibly fair, though it’s my opinion that an established outfielder would make for a better fit. In that vein, an outfield/DH like Kyle Schwarber or Nick Castellanos has a certain rationale to it. The Philadelphia system could use young, cost-controlled players. Playing the quintet of Schwarber, Castellanos, Bryce Harper, Rhys Hoskins, and Alec Bohm is rather awkward defensively. I’ve always been of the opinion that the Phillies signed Schwarber and Castellanos because it was the best option at the time, with the intent to pivot out of one of them or Hoskins following the season. The Pirates ask for Bryan Reynolds is consistently described as comically high, though that can shift without warning. Ian Happ is both a one-year solution and also not very distinct from Hays.

And yes, the elephant in the room, Shohei Ohtani, could technically play outfield. Nobody’s going to do that to him. It would be pretty fantastic to have Ohtani in the designated hitter slot, even if that means a lower plate appearance total for Rutschman. In that event, an upgrade on Hays isn’t remotely necessary. The Orioles under Mike Elias have proceeded so cautiously that I doubt such a trade will come to fruition. Just as I doubt Judge is a plausible target.

Bringing this back to Hays, it’s my opinion that his spot on the roster is one to upgrade in 2024. There is lower-hanging fruit to pluck between second base and the rotation. Giving the farm an additional year of maturation before swapping out league-average players could help. However, more information does not always lead to increased clarity.

The post Austin Hays’ Place In The Plan appeared first on Baltimore Sports and Life.

What Have We Here?

Mateo was, at one time, a fairly notable prospect. The New York Yankees swapped him to the Oakland Athletics as the headliner in the original Sonny Gray trade. Dustin Fowler and James Kaprielian also went westbound in the deal. Mateo, then 22, failed to develop within the Oakland system. He was finally sent packing to the Padres prior to the 2020 season. San Diego gave up on him mid-2021 and Baltimore claimed him. Bad teams are supposed to claim struggling players with carrying traits.

In Mateo’s case, the carrying trait is obvious – speed. Yet he’s always flashed other enticing characteristics too. He hit 19 home runs with the A’s Triple-A affiliate in 2019. Once Statcast was installed league-wide, it became immediately clear Mateo is capable of above-average max exit velocities – even if his average contact is rather paltry. Speed and hard top-end contact make the “what if” game rather interesting. What if he improved his plate discipline? Or his contact rate? Or maybe he’d hit for decent power? Perhaps his wheels could generate some BABIP fortune?

You can almost think of Mateo in Texas Holdem terms (or, if you don’t know poker, don’t worry about this overwrought metaphor). He represents a decent starting hand – say Jack/Queen of hearts. The flop comes out 5 of hearts, 6 of spades, King of spades. You’d usually fold, but nobody forces you out of the hand so you check. Then the turn comes as a 10 of hearts. Suddenly, you’re drawing to an open-end straight and a flush. You have a decent chance for your hand to turn into something. Mateo also had a decent chance, which is why the Padres and Orioles gave him a chance. He appears to have finally rivered a relevant card.

There’s one detail that was holding him back more than anything. The Majors are littered with speedy types who can’t really hit but play good defense. You don’t see them very often because they’re usually in backup roles, but they’re out there. Mateo had the speed, but he drew poor grades as a defender, especially at shortstop. He was pretty terrible in his short stint with Baltimore last season. It’s hard to roster this player-type if they don’t play flashy defense.

Suddenly, he’s doing almost everything well. He still commits too many errors. Among qualified shortstops (23 players), he’s tied third-worst with 16 errors and tied for worst with nine fielding errors. However, he makes up for that with range and a powerful throwing arm. Despite the errors, he rates as a slightly positive defender via virtually every advanced defensive metric. We can again play the “what if” game. In this case, we’ve seen some truly horrible shortstops like Marcus Semien and Carlos Correa turn into plus defenders. Mateo is far more athletic than them. More experience could turn him into a gold glover.

The Buried Lede

This brings us to our “clone.” Once upon a time, the Phillies had a glove-first shortstop prospect they shoved through the minors despite rather paltry hitting. He would flash periods of power, speed, and even a decent batting average, but he was far too frequently overmatched. This player never quite learned plate discipline, but he did figure out how to put the ball in play and even authored a 20/17 season. We’re talking about Freddy Galvis. You’re forgiven if he escaped your attention – just as a Royals fan would have no reason to notice Mateo.

To be sure, Galvis and Mateo have many notable differences. The developmental backgrounds were inversed, Galvis never had Mateo’s 80-grade speed, and Mateo got a much later start to his career as a Major League regular.

However, there are also some instructive similarities. Both shortstops lack plate discipline and try to use aggression as a way to prevent strikeouts. Said aggression also allows them to occasionally ambush a fastball or unexpectedly loft a breaking ball into the seats. As hitters, no executive in their right mind would shout “that’s somebody I need to start!” Toss in the capable shortstop defense, and we’re talking about likable league-average players.

This season, Mateo has delivered 12 home runs and 30 steals to go with a .226/.275/.394 batting line. Galvis’ peak offensive seasons were similar, albeit with fewer thefts. Check it out.

Mateo’s superior speed is more or less offset by the higher strikeout rate. Otherwise, they’re similar quality hitters.

Ok, So What?

The Orioles find themselves in a fun situation. We talk on most episodes of The Warehouse podcast about off-season plans. The topic of free agent shortstops is always lurking near the surface. It’s the position with the most readily available supply. The Orioles, with their virtually league minimum payroll, have the opportunity to set the market. Acquiring outside talent is a tried-and-true method to improve a roster. Unfortunately, between this market and the presence of Gunnar Henderson, it’s not clear Mateo has an everyday role with the 2023 Orioles.

That’s OK. Ideal even. During Galvis’ peak, he played for Phillies clubs that won 71 and 66 games. He then joined the Padres en route to 66 wins. The next year, he signed up with the Blue Jays. They won 67 games, but not before trading Galvis to the 75-win Reds.

When you start a player of Galvis or Mateo’s caliber at shortstop, you’re playing with a hand tied behind your back. The majority of 2022 contenders are anchored by a franchise cornerstone shortstop. There are exceptions – J.P. Crawford, Ha-Seong Kim, Bryson Stott, and Jeremy Pena aren’t vastly better or worse than Mateo. Those clubs have other stalwarts. Generally, you want a superstar shortstop on the payroll.

Let’s say they do sign a shortstop. That leaves Baltimore with Henderson at third base and a pile of options at second – Mateo, Ramon Urias, Jordan Westburg, Terrin Vavra, Joseph Ortiz, and Connor Norby are all either on hand, big league ready, or expected to be so at some point during 2023. That depth will, inevitably, be needed. An axiom in baseball – you will always need all of your depth. Sidenote: the org loves Joey Ortiz.

Players like Mateo, Urias, Vavra, and others are great discoveries because they extend the roster with their utility and add resilience in the event of an injury apocalypse. If Baltimore executes their plan this offseason, Mateo will find himself as one of the best bench players in the league – or a part-time second baseman. At least Rougned Odor will be gone. Right?

The post Cloned Orioles: Jorge Mateo appeared first on Baltimore Sports and Life.

The first of these is Bobby Witt Jr. The Royals rookie shortstop has yet to fully overcome a poor approach against breaking balls outside the strike zone. Otherwise, he’s shown plenty of talent. A .252/.294/.443 triple-slash in 472 plate appearances is a shade above league average, and he’s added value on the basepaths too. His defensive skills are a work in progress. We can chalk that up to his relative youthfulness. The future is bright for Witt Jr., but his odds of winning the Rookie of the Year are long.

Jeremy Pena has the same longshot odds to win as Witt Jr. He’s batting a comparable .249/.290/.419 in 412 plate appearances. Where Pena differs is via superior defense. At one point, he had a better shot at sticking his nose in the race. Unfortunately, since the All-Star Break, he’s hit just .215/.241/.336 in 158 plate appearances.

Steven Kwan has the longest odds of the plausible winners. He deserves better, but his forms of production aren’t traditionally rewarded by the Baseball Writers Association of America voters. In 455 plate appearances, he’s batting .299/.372/.393 while supplying above average defense in left field. He has more walks than strikeouts along with the second-lowest swinging strike rate in the league after Luis Arraez. Overall, he’s posted a 2.9 fWAR (that’s FanGraphs version of Wins Above Replacement, a tidy all-in-one valuation stat) season to date – not far behind those of Rodriguez and Rutschman. Kwan has acted as the sparkplug of the first-place Guardians.

The Real Race

With the also-rans out of the way, let’s focus on the real race between Rodriguez and Rutschman. Statistically, the players are neck-and-neck. However, betting sites have set the current odds thusly:

Rodriguez: -350
Rutschman: +300

Kyle Newman of OddsChecker.com recently calculated the implied chance of each player winning based on these odds, determining Rodriguez has been given a 78 percent shot at victory. Per Newman, oddsmakers are “often strong in predicting” Rookie of the Year winners. Rutschman, who was +280 when the implied chance was calculated on Monday, was given a 26 percent chance to win. Presumably, Rodriguez is slightly more favored today. You might notice the odds add up to more than 100 percent. That’s one way sportsbooks make money.

Ironically, Rutschman has actually outperformed Rodriguez in every major facet of the game. He’s having the better hitting season, is massively more impactful on defense, and, incredibly, has even contributed more value than Rodriguez on the basepaths. So why is Rodriguez favored?

The 21-year-old future Seattle superstar is batting .271/.329/.470 in 450 plate appearances. That equates to a 131 wRC+ (read as 31 percent above average). He’s hit 19 home runs with 23 stolen bases, 62 runs, and 63 RBI. By comparison, Rutschman is batting .257/.368/.451, good for a 138 wRC+. Where he lags is with counting stats. He’s compiled just 307 plate appearances with eight home runs, two steals, 49 runs, and 25 RBI. While Rutschman has (narrowly) been the better hitter on a per plate appearance basis, Rodriguez has simply compiled more.

Despite playing 32 more games with 147 more plate appearances, Rodriguez’s 3.4 fWAR comes in a hair behind Rutschman’s 3.6 fWAR. Defense is largely to blame. Rodriguez has cost the Mariners a couple runs in the outfield pastures while Rutschman has saved a handful with his glovework. Those defensive valuations are based on average performance at their respective positions. Of course, a catcher is far more important than a center fielder which WAR acknowledges via a position adjustment. If a center fielder and a catcher were to have identical stats over a full season, the catcher would be credited with one additional win. For instance, a 3.0 WAR center fielder would be a 4.0 WAR catcher, all else equal.

Framed in that sense, we can see why oddsmakers like Rodriguez. His contributions are in the form of bulky hitting stats. Nearly all of his value has come from his bat. Rutschman’s stick has been just as fine, but around half of his WAR is from defense and “position adjustment.” Even sabermetrically-inclined voters can be a little squirmy about using adjustment values in an awards race. The traditionalists will throw it out entirely.

Personally, were I to be granted a ballot to cast today, I think the correct choice is Rutschman by a landslide. And I also believe he has a much better chance to woo voters than the odds currently imply.

Here’s why discerning voters could overlook the discrepancy in games played when it comes time to cast ballots. As you might recall, Rutschman was in the mix to make the Orioles out of Spring Training. A triceps injury cost him all of April and most of May. Our own Zach Eisner wrote about The Rutschman Effect a couple days ago. As he notes, the now 64-58 Orioles were just 16-25 without Rutschman. In other words, they’re 48-33 with Rutschman, a .592 winning percentage that only narrowly trails the division leading Yankees (.613 winning percentage). The O’s have accomplished this with a decided lack of high-profile players. Rutschman sure seems like he’s carrying the club.

Moreover, we should consider pace of performance. A little under one-quarter of the season remains. Rodriguez has played three quarters of a season. Rutschman, just half a season. Let’s imagine both players continue at the same pace. Rutschman would finish with around 5.0-5.5 WAR. Rodriguez is pushing towards a 4.5 WAR season. Should the players finish in this way, it would be easier for the voters to justify the WAR position adjustment as a tiebreaker.

While Rookie of the Year doesn’t have the same definitional arguments as Most Valuable Player (i.e. what is “value” intended to mean?), continued contention by the Orioles can only help Rutschman’s candidacy. He’s already the team MVP, and such leadership could nudge some voters to pick against the so-called “obvious” choice of Rodriguez. Of course, the Mariners are also contending which gives Rodriguez his own platform for high-profile heroics.

In any event, the oddsmakers say Rodriguez has the AL Rookie of the Year in the bag. It’s his to lose. The stats say they’re tied despite far less volume from Rutschman. I believe this is truly a coin toss. The victor will be decided by the final quarter of the season.

The post AL ROY Update appeared first on Baltimore Sports and Life.

As you might recall, the popular projection systems at FanGraphs and Baseball Prospectus expected between 61 and 64 wins. An alternate approach – counting projected WAR for THE BAT X system was the most bullish method with an implied total of 67 to 71 wins. Personally, I agreed with the THE BAT X but for one important caveat. Since they’d be playing nearly half their games against AL East foes with an expected .555 winning percentage, they would underperform in the standings.

Well, here we are on a Tuesday in mid-August. The Orioles already have 61 wins and 55 losses. That leaves 46 more games before the end of the regular season. Unless they go through a historical collapse the rest of the way, we can confidently say the projections missed the mark. Entering last night, American League East clubs (excluding the O’s) have a .546 winning percentage. That’s close to our original expectation. What we missed is that the Yankees would dominate the division while the other three clubs fell a tad flat. Excluding the Bombers, Baltimore’s divisional rivals have a .520 winning percentage (again, entering last night). Instead of 56 especially challenging games, it’s only been the 11 against the Yankees (they have three more to play).

In March, I posited that the new left field dimensions could help. Originally projected for one of the worst pitching staffs, the Orioles have compiled a 15th-best 3.92 ERA – slightly better than the leaguewide average of a 3.99 ERA. It’s also a sight better than the 5.85 ERA a similar collection of pitchers managed in 2021. If Camden Yards explains a chunk of the improvement, we should expect to find stark home/road ERA splits. Try this on for size.

Road: 4.41 ERA (entering last night)
Home: 3.41 ERA

Yep, they’ve been a full-run better at home. I hypothesized the left-handed starters would most benefit from the new dimensions. Bruce Zimmermann was the poster child with a 3.98 ERA at home and a 7.50 ERA on the road. Northpaw Jordan Lyles profited even more with a 2.73 home ERA compared to a 5.85 away ERA. Austin Voth has been much better on the road in limited work. Dean Kremer and Tyler Wells had only modest home/road splits. It should be noted, such splits aren’t usually helpful analytic tools outside of Coors Field. They’re an interesting description of what happened but rarely have much predictive value.

Besides getting quite a few palatable starts from unexpected sources like Lyles, Zimmermann, Kremer, and especially Wells the Orioles have really benefited from their relief corps. Their 3.06 bullpen ERA is third-best in the league, trailing only the Astros and Yankees. They’ve outpaced the Dodgers and Braves, both of which entered the season with juggernaut relief corps. Erstwhile Oriole Jorge Lopez’s breakout was slightly predictable, especially once it was apparent his velocity played up in short bursts. Felix Bautista stood out in Spring Training as a new pitcher – though nobody could have anticipated a 1.65 ERA. The emergence of Dillon Tate, Cionel Perez, Joey Krehbiel, and Keegan Akin all at the same time is nothing short of incredible. Highly improbable is another way of putting it. I’m still waiting for the regression hammer to drop on one or all of them.

The park dimensions were thought to be a double-edged sword. Indeed, Ryan Mountcastle, Austin Hays, and Trey Mancini have hit fewer home runs than they would have at a neutral stadium. The Mancini trade served as case-in-point. He immediately smacked a trio of home runs after hitting just 10 in 410 plate appearances for the Orioles. Only switch-hitter Anthony Santander has reached the 20-homer plateau, and I have no easy way to see how many of his eight home runs at Camden Yards were hit from the right side.

Cedric Mullins was a potential source of optimism entering the season. Projection systems tabbed him for roughly three-win (3.0 WAR) play. He was a six-win player in 2021, and the performance was largely believable. Importantly, he isn’t affected by the new left field fence – all of his power is to the pull side. Instead of replicating 2021, he’s posted a roughly league average .264/.322/.395 batting line, putting him on pace for a three-win season. Chalk one up for the projection systems.

Adley Rutschman took a little longer to arrive than originally anticipated. His .246/.354/.428 batting line has been a welcome improvement on the struggles of Robinson Chirinos. Incidentally, the Orioles are 44-31 since his arrival. The other impending reinforcements – Grayson Rodriguez, Kyle Bradish, DL Hall, and Kyle Stowers in particular – have done nothing worthy of mention at the Major League level. Terrin Vavra, Jordan Westburg, and Gunnar Henderson were name dropped in the original article as potential late-season callups. Vavra has taken the spot I thought would go to Stowers, though he’s only performed at a replacement level in 15 games. Henderson played his way to top prospect status, but a 2023 promotion seems unlikely.

The March article concluded with a call for waiver moves and other external additions. The Orioles have largely eschewed those in favor of in-house options. Jorge Mateo – picked up mid-2021 – has been a revelation and a welcome addition at shortstop. Whether or not he can maintain what reminds me of a peak Freddy Galvis season, he’s played a large role in getting the Orioles to where they are today. Austin Voth was the lone impactful in-season addition. After coughing up a 10.13 ERA in 18.2 innings with the Nationals, he’s posted a luck-neutral 3.21 ERA, mostly as a starter. To the angst of some, they subtracted Lopez and Mancini at the trade deadline.

So, how did we get here? Rutschman leads the club with 2.8 WAR. Other contenders tend to have at least one player above or near 4.0 WAR. Mullins and Mateo are the only others to eclipse 2.0 WAR. Lyles, the pitching leader, checks in with just 1.8 WAR. It’s not breakouts carrying this club, but we need to remember that floor can be just as important as ceiling. On the negative side, only Chirinos, Chris Owings, and Tyler Nevin have been outright terrible. Overall, 15 players have negative contributions per WAR. Last season, the Orioles received negative contributions from 27 players including nine with -0.5 WAR or worse. Tightening up the bottom of the roster has clearly provided a benefit in the win column.

Two other factors have greatly aided Baltimore’s unlikely Hunt for Orange October. The surprisingly elite bullpen has allowed the club to overcome glaring weaknesses in their rotation. Lastly, aside from the Yankees, the division has played a LOT softer than expected. That softness not only lends itself with a better Orioles win-total, it also means they now have a plausible path to second place in the division.

The post Orioles: Projections Revisited appeared first on Baltimore Sports and Life.

My spin…

We discussed the possibility of a Mancini trade on the most recent episode of The Warehouse. I was on record as believing a deal to be unlikely. Few teams are looking to buy first base/designate hitter types. The market includes as many recognizable names as prospective buyers. By striking first, the Orioles ensured they wouldn’t lose this MLB-edition of musical chairs.

The acquisition of Seth Johnson exceeded my expectations. As Matt noted, his combination of Rule 5 eligibility and recent Tommy John surgery makes him an unusual asset from a team control perspective. Injured players typically aren’t selected in the Rule 5 draft, but it would be a serious risk to leave him off the roster. He’ll only clog the 40-man roster over the winter after which he can be placed on the 60-day injured list. However, in addition to the missed time, Johnson appears to require about a full season of further development before he’s ready for primetime. Possibly two years. That will chew through options and/or service time.

While most prospect reports still reckon Johnson a starting pitcher prospect, I view him as a high probability reliever – high probability in this case referring to both a likelihood to wind up in the ‘pen and a future as an above average big league contributor. This enters into the above Rule 5 considerations. A team could pick him, stash him on the injured list, then carry him over to 2024 as a reliever. It’s a sort of long-con that most clubs won’t be interested in pursuing which is why the Orioles could roll the dice and leave him off the roster.

As for the other guy they acquired, they’re taking a chance on Chayce McDermott. I honestly don’t have any insights to add – he’s a typical dev-project with some likeable traits and a long way to go.

With the first domino toppled, what’s next for the Orioles on Deadline Day?

The club features several marketable players who could be wearing a new uniform tomorrow. Anthony Santander and Jorge Lopez are the two we’ve talked about all season as potential trade bait. They’re both controlled through the end of 2024. In other words, there’s no pressure to force a trade.

Jordan Lyles has a pricey $11MM club option for 2023. He’s likely headed back to the open market after the season. Lyles is by no means an exciting pitcher, but there are multiple contenders who would appreciate somebody who can take the ball every five days without always falling on his face. His 4.56 ERA is only slightly worse than the league average 3.99 ERA.

Less likely to be dealt are Austin Hays and Cedric Mullins. They’re solidly above average players with three more seasons of club control remaining. Said control could yield a robust and surprising trade offer. Mullins, a center fielder, would be difficult to replace. An offer would have to press a LOT of buttons.

Hays could be replicated by any number of affordable upcoming free agents. The likes of David Peralta, Joc Pederson, Michael Brantley, Andrew Benintendi, A.J. Pollock, Joey Gallo, and Mitch Haniger are all set to hit the market this winter. For now, so is Aaron Judge.

In the short term, they can bring back DJ Stewart for a final trial if Santander or Hays are dealt. Stewart was designated for assignment in April and is currently working his way back from an undisclosed injury. That’s assuming Mancini’s spot in the lineup goes to Kyle Stowers.

A last area to mention is the bullpen. Yesterday, the Cubs dealt Scott Effross to the Yankees for a good-not-great pitching prospect (Hayden Wesneski). It was a win-win swap for the Cubs and Yankees even though it involved a good relief pitcher with five more seasons of club control. Baltimore could be open to similar swaps involving their surprisingly effective relief corps. While I doubt they’re actively shopping the likes of Felix Bautista, Dillon Tate, Cionel Perez, and others, I also assume they’ve received inquiries. Some of them might even be good enough to engage upon.

What about contending?

A Mancini trade doesn’t mean the Orioles can’t continue to pursue contention – though it certainly isn’t a great message to send the clubhouse. In the short term, Mancini can be directly replaced with Stowers, a volatile power-hitting outfielder who could conceivably outplay Mancini over the remainder of the season. The Steamer projection system on FanGraphs already projects Stowers as (very slightly) better than Mancini. The other two systems – ZiPS and THE BAT – strongly prefer Mancini. I figure Stowers has somewhere around a one-in-four chance to outperform Mancini.

Mike Elias has clearly signaled his intent to continue stockpiling assets. However, every system has players they’ve given up on who other franchises view as salvageable. Such players could be used to acquire less attractive reinforcements. For instance, Madison Bumgarner is signed to an overpriced contract through 2024. He’s owed the balance of $23MM this season, another $23MM next year, and only $14MM in 2024. Despite performing well-below his Giants prime, Bumgarner has managed to compile a lucky-looking 3.83 ERA in a tough division while averaging over five innings a start.

Bumgarner is an illustrative example. He could modestly bolster their current playoff aspirations without costing any actual prospect capital. While such players do cost real American USD, the Orioles balance sheets are ridiculously open. With the wave of talent cresting in the minors, they have another four or five years of incredibly affordable players on the way.

What I want?

Well, what I’d hoped to see was for the Orioles to keep Mancini and largely stand pat. Basically, a vote of confidence on the current roster – addition by not making the long-expected subtractions. Alas, it was not meant to be.

If we accept that Baltimore won’t be making any trades that don’t brighten the future, that still leaves a narrow path to bolster the club using only cash considerations and non-prospects. Despite a better than .500 record, they’re a longshot to reach the postseason. However, it would be a shame to squander this opportunity to play meaningful baseball into late-September. Give the likes of Mullins, Mountcastle, Hays, and others a taste of contending.

These are important veterans to the club who have likely grown accustomed to losing. They toil for a contract and personal gain. Contending now gives them a small taste of the pressure, nerves, and comradery associated with postseason baseball. They’ll be less likely to choke in future seasons when the Orioles take aim at multiple pennants.

The post Deadline Day And Mancini Fallout appeared first on Baltimore Sports and Life.

Naturally, I began the exercise with Juan Soto. After telling half the story with 500 words, it occurred that maybe we should focus on only Soto today. We can talk about five more targets soon enough.

A caveat: I will do the infuriating thing every team blogger does and pull together a sample offer for Soto. This is meant to be illustrative, not accurate. Soto will cost a seemingly absurd amount, even with a little idea I included to cut the prospect cost.

Why Might the Nationals Trade Him?

In short, because their farm system and active roster are terrible, and Soto has rejected two large (but still cheapskate) extension offers. There’s speculation the Lerner family would like to sell too. Getting the books ship shape should improve the value of the franchise. If Soto won’t stay as a bargain, a lean payroll with a passable farm system might improve the team’s appeal to prospective buyers. Most importantly, it doesn’t look like Soto will have an opportunity to contribute to a winning Nationals roster before he reaches free agency. He’s wasted on them, and they know it.

Why Should the Orioles Want Him?

We can answer this a dozen ways, but the best reason is really simple. At 46-46, the club is limping out of a prolonged rebuild. Ownership is the subject of considerable controversy (a topic I’ll otherwise ignore in this piece but could very well affect the club’s ability to take aggressive actions). Nothing announces “we’re back baby!” more than acquiring the best player in baseball. From a financial perspective, Soto would pay for himself (excluding a possible contract extension) in direct ticket sales.

To Extend or Not to Extend…

‘Tis the question. There are some advantages to taking it season-to-season. Let’s say things don’t go well for the club in 2024, but Soto has performed as expected. He could be traded again for another hefty return. If, as some perceive, Soto will only sign a market-rate extension, then the Orioles could simply get in line with such an offer after the 2024 campaign is completed. That’s regardless of how the next two seasons turn out and applies to other clubs as well. An untimely major injury could change his free agent outlook.

Otherwise, an extension probably has to check-in north of $500MM over more than 10 seasons. It’s a hefty commitment to one player, one that only a few franchises can tackle.

Who Can Afford Him?

There are two angles to affordability when it comes to Soto – money and prospects. By examining these, we’ll see the market is actually quite small.

Excluded

I assume the Nationals will not entertain offers from the Mets, Phillies, Braves, or Marlins. The Mets and Phillies don’t have sufficient prospects to make a trade even if they could swallow the budgetary hit. The Braves and Marlins tend to avoid large outlays. Atlanta also has a dearth of prospects.

The Cash

Soto is on a $17.1MM contract this season. About $7.6MM remains to be paid. Additionally, he is club controlled via arbitration for two more seasons. The total outlay for those seasons should be in the neighborhood of $60MM.

Presently, the Orioles are on the hook for $2.975MM to John Means and arb raises to Anthony Santander (about $5MM), Jorge Lopez (about $4MM), and Austin Voth (about $1MM). I doubt the options for Trey Mancini or Jordan Lyles come into play. Most of us expect Santander to be traded. Voth is a nontender candidate. Basically, they’ll spend about $20MM on league minimum guys and anywhere from $7MM-$12MM on other rostered players.

I estimate the Orioles revenues can immediately support a payroll of around $150MM with room to grow at around $25MM per season throughout a window of contention. Soto fits within that hypothetical budget with around $90MM to spare.

The Dodgers and Yankees, despite large payrolls, can open the books for a player of Soto’s caliber. That’s because their revenues dwarf the current luxury tax threshold. They’d rather not pay tax but also recognize the value of special players. The Dodgers even have an immediate need for a left fielder while the Yankees would have to continue using less-than-ideal defensive alignments to squeeze in Soto.

The Mariners, Cardinals, Tigers, Red Sox, and Giants are large payroll clubs with under $100MM committed to their 2023 rosters. A few other clubs I won’t completely rule out are the Blue Jays, Rangers, and Twins. They’d need to contort a bit to make it work.

The Cubs are probably at the wrong stage of their rebuild. Similarly, the Angels could probably afford Soto, but they have to realize their problem isn’t a lack of superstars. They need to disaggregate their payroll. The Astros probably feel like they have plenty of offense and need pitching.

I’m not sure about the Padres who are rumored to be pursuing an extension with Joe Musgrove. That would probably put them out of the running for Soto. However, A.J. Preller makes interesting, aggressive moves. For now, I’ll leave them out since I suspect they’re focused elsewhere.

All told, eight teams look like they absolutely should be on the phone with the Nationals. Another three to five clubs should keep tabs on the market.

The Prospects

To field an attractive offer, a club has to have at least one Top 10-caliber prospect and considerable farm system depth. The Orioles have both available. The Yankees, Mariners, Padres, Cardinals, Red Sox, and Giants seem to have the necessary pieces too. The Dodgers, I believe, could get there via quantity even if the top-end quality doesn’t match other offers.

Since I figure the Padres have other priorities, that leaves the Nationals with seven prospective partners. An advantage in the Yankees and Dodgers favor is that they can spend through any issues created by the trade. But will they want to? The other clubs mentioned, including the O’s, need their farm systems to continue yielding fruit.

Comparable Trades

While nobody has acquired a player of Soto’s caliber with this much club control remaining, there are still a couple historical comps we can examine. For Chris Sale, the White Sox received Yoan Moncada (roughly Rodriguez or Henderson), Michael Kopech (between Rodriguez and D.L. Hall), Victor Diaz (equivalent to a fringe top 100 prospect), and Luis Alexander Basabe (ditto). Sale, I’d estimate, was roughly half as valuable as Soto. He was under team-friendly contract for another three seasons.

The other comp, if Corbin happens to be included, was the Mookie Betts trade. The Red Sox didn’t exactly make out like bandits in this one. Betts was probably about a third as valuable as Soto at the time of the deal due to less club control. The Sox received Alex Verdugo (similar to Cowser), Jeter Downs, and Connor Wong. My perception is Boston misevaluated Downs who at the time had star-caliber stats on top of a mixed scouting reports.

A Wrinkle in the O’s Favor

A possible key to a Soto deal might be Patrick Corbin. Like David Price in the Betts deal, Corbin could serve to subtract from Soto’s value to the point where an inquiring team might both make a fair offer and have something resembling an acceptable farm system after the trade.

Corbin is owed about $69MM through the end of 2024. Including Corbin in a Soto trade would reduce the prospect price tag from unfathomable to merely jaw-dropping. Unlike other contenders, the Orioles also happen to have an immediate use for Corbin. Similar to Jordan Lyles, he regularly faces 25 to 30 batters a start. Baltimore needs innings to get through this season, even if they aren’t always pretty.

The Orioles are the only team that can add Corbin’s salary without batting an eye. The price is particularly prohibitive for the Dodgers and Yankees. Not only would they be overpaying for Corbin, they’d also owe additional luxury tax and could slide north of the high penalty thresholds.

The Mariners and Tigers are the only other clubs I believe could finagle the budget for both Soto and Corbin.

The Cost, Maybe?

Based on the two comps above, the cost for Soto should be on the order of four Top 10-caliber prospects and another two to four players who have some chance to develop into a role player of some kind.

It is, I believe, strategic for the Orioles to include Corbin in their offer. It’s a way to nudge most of the other prospective buyers out of the market while holding on to a few of their top prospects.

The following offer seemingly cannot be topped by another club, short of the Mariners including Julio Rodriguez. From this starting point, Baltimore can attempt to economize. Maybe there are less developed prospects who can be subbed in place of guys on the cusp of the Majors. Maybe the Nationals are so keen to dump salary that only one front-line prospect is needed to headline a quantity-based package. Maybe something else!

Grayson Rodriguez or Gunnar Henderson
Colton Cowser or Coby Mayo
Jordan Westburg or D.L. Hall
Kyle Stowers
Connor Norby
Leandro Arias

-for-

Juan Soto
Patrick Corbin

Should They Do It?

Only if they’re serious about contending in 2023 and 2024. The price looks like a lot, but Soto will probably outperform all nine of those players combined over the next two and a half seasons. Beyond that… it’s anyone’s guess.

The post Make The Argument: Juan Soto and The Orioles appeared first on Baltimore Sports and Life.

His triple-slash line is sufficient to spot the greatest weakness in his approach – plate discipline. More specifically, he rarely walks. A pitcher almost has to try to walk him. Mountcastle is an equal opportunity hacker with the sixth-highest swing rate on pitches within the zone. And this is a good list to be a part of: Avisail Garcia, Bryce Harper, Ozzie Albies, Kyle Tucker, and Luis Robert. Of those players, only Garcia has struggled this season, and he’s coming off an excellent season. More ominously, only nine qualified hitters reach more frequently for pitches outside of the strike zone. It’s not all bad news. Robert, Javy Baez, Albies, and Salvador Perez are some of the players with worse chase rates. They’re pretty good! Maikel Franco, Jonathan Schoop, and Jose Iglesias are also ahead of him. They’re not so good.

Lurking one spot behind Mountcastle on the out-of-the-zone swing list is Phillies “outfielder” Nick Castellanos. As we’re about to learn, free-swinging and painful outfield defense aren’t the only traits shared by Mountcastle and Castellanos.

The Statcast Lens

For those unfamiliar with Statcast and the Baseball Savant website, the landing page for each player has a series of “percentile rankings” in key statistics. Let’s look at Mountcastle and Castellanos side-by-side. For this exercise, I’ve used Castellanos’ 2021 data since he’s only recently shaken off an early-season funk. It’s worth noting Castellanos’ current production looks an awful lot like Mountcastle’s 2021. In other words, even consistent hitters like Castellanos experience a range of outcomes.

Castellanos   

Mountcastle                                               

Off the bat, we can see a number of key similarities. It’s easier to note where they differ. Mountcastle is showing more feel for hard and barreled contact at the expense of a few more strikeouts. Those traits have parlayed into a better average exit velocity even though their best contact (Max Exit Velocity) is comparable. He’s also a little bit slower which explains why he can’t quite fake it in an outfield corner like Castellanos. Ignore outs above average – that’s an outfielding metric. I’m unsure why Mountcastle has a rating (he should not).  

Other Statcast metrics confirm further similarities. Each produces an average launch angle of roughly 15 degrees – close to optimized for doubles and home run power while hitting for a decent batting average. The vast majority of their batted balls fall between 90- and 110-mph. These are exit velocities which serve to increase a hitter’s batting average on balls in play (BABIP). Sure enough, Castellanos has a career .330 BABIP compared to a .318 BABIP for Mountcastle. League average hovers between a .290 and .300 BABIP.

More Stats

Switching over to more traditional statistics, both players run below average infield fly ball rates. Castellanos was almost Votto-ian prior to 2021. A low infield fly ball rate typically indicates what’s referred to as a tight launch angle. You can think of this as consistency of contact. A 15-degree average launch angle is better when it’s composed entirely of 15-degree contact. If the angles range evenly from 0 to 30 degrees, that means there’s a bunch of easy outs going into the 15-degree average.

Superficially, the pair tallies comparable walk and strikeout rates. Their batting averages, on base, and slugging percentages fall within the same ranges. Which means more advanced stats like ISO, wOBA, and wRC+ (don’t worry about these if they aren’t familiar to you) also appear similar. Here’s this paragraph in table form:

As noted, the two players make similar decisions on when to swing (most of the time) and when to take (not so often). Castellanos is only minutely more discerning than Mountcastle. One detail to note, Castellanos has always been hackastic, but he’s aged into this extremity of aggression. When he was Mountcastle’s age, he was relatively patient compared to now – though he was not patient compared to the league.

I find myself wondering if changes in the way the game is played help explain some of the differences between early-career Castellanos and current Mountcastle. From 2013-2019, Castellanos hit nearly twice as many doubles (229) as home runs (120). That relationship was closer to one-for-one during his two seasons with the Reds. This year, he has 17 doubles and seven home runs. Mountcastle, however, has just 39 doubles compared to 50 home runs. Generally, only the great home run hitters (or flawed homer-or-bust role players) have considerably more dingers than doubles.

Castellanos debuted prior to the fly ball revolution. Many unknown truths were public knowledge by the time Mountcastle was nearing his Major League debut. Advances to the science of hitting have led to sharply increasing hard and barreled contact rates in recent seasons. It could be that a peak-aged Castellanos would have shared current-Mountcastle’s penchant for barreled contact with more home runs than doubles.

Does It Mean Anything?

Only in a historic sense. The two players have followed a similar path to date, but that doesn’t mean they’ll continue to do so. Castellanos is aging and could enter a rough decline phase anytime in the next decade. Mountcastle is young enough to completely reinvent himself. Maybe he learns plate discipline over the offseason. Teams are making incredible hitting breakthroughs that haven’t yet had much of an effect on the field. He’s already ahead of where Castellanos was as a 25-year-old.

For now, Orioles fans can take heart that the most-similar player to Mountcastle is an All-Star caliber slugger who has thrived for the better part of a decade. While this talent profile is seemingly rare, the future appears to be bright.

The post Cloned Orioles: Ryan Mountcastle appeared first on Baltimore Sports and Life.

These Baltimore Orioles are not vegan. They’re actually doing some pretty cool baseball things. My very first article with BSL examined the preseason projections which were dire. Public analytics tools expected between 61 and 64 wins. The commentariat at the BSL forums expected another win total beginning with a “5.” Presently, the club is 13-18 (14-18 after today), a 68-win pace. FanGraphs now projects 67 wins – in other words, they’ll maintain their pace.

Let’s take a closer look at what’s happening. For the sake of my sanity, I will not be including the 5/12 game which is happening as I type this.

Run Scoring
Grade: D-

The good news is the Orioles are not the worst offense in baseball. The Detroit Tigers have scored 33 fewer runs. Even the Boston Red Sox and Chicago White Sox are trailing Baltimore. Of course, that maybe isn’t as good as it sounds – those two clubs will regress to score more runs. The O’s have scored 3.48 runs per game and struggled to eclipse even three runs scored for much of April. This is what we expected all along. The FanGraphs projection engine expects 4.43 runs per game going forward. Only the Tigers, Royals, Athletics, and Pirates project for fewer runs scored.  

The offense consists of four or five bright spots depending on your perspective. Additionally, Trey Mancini is no longer snakebit. Since the publication of this article detailing his ill-luck, he’s batting .341/.383/.364. The power will come.

Cedric Mullins is replicating his excellent 2021 campaign which bodes well for the club whether they intend to eventually extend him or cash out at the trade deadline. He has a .264/.333/.464 batting line with five home runs and five steals – a roughly 25/25 pace.

Anthony Santander has fixed his most glaring defect – poor plate discipline. Such adjustments are not uncommon, but they rarely stick after the month of April. Indeed, Santander’s swing rate at pitches outside the zone is four points higher in May (33%) than April (29%). The good news is it still checks in well-below his career average (38%). Santander’s power hasn’t shown up as much as expected. Not only is power notoriously fickle, you might have heard something about the leaguewide power outage.

Austin Hays is also doing what’s necessary to remain in the lineup. While his walk and strikeout rates seemingly suggest improved discipline, a deeper delve into the data reveals no change. He’s benefiting from a .344 BABIP and circumstance. While he should remain an acceptable hitter, the analytics I use believe he’s a league average (2 WAR) player. That’s good in the context of the 2022 Orioles, but it won’t cut it on future rosters. He could be trade bait if he doesn’t find another gear.

I liken Ryan Mountcastle to Nick Castellanos. And like Castellanos, it might be a long time before he makes the transition from decent bat-only player to true mid-lineup threat – if it ever happens at all. The Mountcastle-as-Castellanos comp merits a deeper conversation so let’s set it aside for now. Bottom line: he’s hitting decently.

Last and least among the effective hitters is Jorge Mateo, a toolsy athlete who has long lacked for on-field results. He’s managed to keep his head above water by providing positive value on the basepaths and in field. Mateo has poor plate discipline and struggles to make contact (16.3% SwStr%). However, he’s managed an unholy 38 percent line drive rate which has helped to fuel his early pseudo-success. He even homered today. Mateo is making a case to stick around as an all-over utility man once better infielders arrive.

Run Prevention
Grade: C

The Orioles are only 11th-worst at run-prevention despite losing John Means after eight innings. That works out to 4.22 runs per game. FanGraphs isn’t sanguine about the future – they’re projected for a league-worst 5.33 runs per game over the balance of the season. Five pitchers have performed in a way that merits further comment.

Bruce Zimmermann has been a revelation, albeit one we all expect to regress in the bad way. Hardly anybody maintains a 2.67 ERA, and Zimmermann lacks the characteristics of those who do. That said, the soft-tossing southpaw is missing a ton of bats and seems to be stepping right into Means’ shoes. Like Means, his best offering is a changeup. The new dimensions at Camden Yards have helped. Last season, he allowed 1.96 HR/9. This year, he’s humming at just 0.30 HR/9. That number will rise – how far it rises will determine if he’s a mid-rotation innings-eater or just an inventory arm.

Former reliever Tyler Wells has also pitched well in six starts. He’s even extended to five or more innings in each of his last three starts. An extreme fly ball pitcher, he too benefits from the new park dimensions. That was kind of the point when they changed the fences. In what’s sure to be a theme for the Orioles in years to come, Wells has really upped his changeup usage. It interacts nicely with his slider and fastball. He might be best off never throwing another curve.

Kyle Bradish’s first two starts weren’t exactly impressive. My scouting report was simple: funky delivery and minus command with too many mistakes over the heart of the plate. Then he slayed the Cardinals over seven innings with 11 strikeouts. He induced a 15.6% SwStr% on the day. That’s what we want to see! Dating back to his time in Triple-A, Bradish has been inconsistent from start-to-start this season. His curve and changeup have taken a back seat to his heater and slider combo. Worst case (besides injury), he can comfortably fall back on a high leverage reliever role.

Two relievers have performed well. Jorge Lopez is getting by via 98-mph heaters and the lowest hard-contact rate in the league. Per Statcast, which uses exit velocity to calculate its HardHit%, Lopez’s 16.7 percent rate narrowly edges out Wil Crowe, Evan Phillips, and Ryan Helsley. He’s also done a great job keeping the ball on the ground. He’ll need to maintain this particular brand of exceptionalism to remain a late-inning reliever – not to mention a coveted trade deadline asset.

The other reliever in question is Felix Bautista. Between a punishing 98-mph fastball, a slider, and a splitter, Bautista is an uncomfortable opponent to face. He actually benefits from his reputation for poor command – it keeps hitters on their toes. If he can maintain a sub-4.00 BB/9, Bautista looks like a high leverage centerpiece for years to come.

Fielding
Grade: C-

Fielding metrics don’t do a great job with less than one-fifth of a season to grade. However, it’s fair to say the Orioles lack for any notably above-average fielders. Nobody’s a blackhole either besides the possible exceptions of Rougned Odor and Robinson Chirinos, neither of whom is likely to have a major role for much longer.

Bits and Bobs

Orioles beat writer Dan Connolly believes Adley Rutschman could be promoted by the end of next week, per this piece on The Athletic. Connolly doesn’t come right out and name date, instead only indicating that next Monday is unlikely but his tenure in the minors will also end before May (unless something goes horribly wrong).

Yusniel Diaz has been back in action for about 10 days, and he’s hitting well (.333/.420/.548). Unfortunately, the O’s current outfield is hitting well too.

Jahmai Jones is hitting poorly. He’s the most prepared to supplant Odor.

Nick Vespi has proven he should be in the big-league bullpen. 13.1 innings, 0.00 ERA, 12.83 K/9, 2.03 BB/9, 18.5% SwStr%.

Grayson Rodriguez is stranded on 19 batters faced. His most recent outing lasted 5.1 scoreless frames, a partial rebound from two substandard appearances. I say “partial” because he issued three walks with only five strikeouts. D.L. Hall has ascended to Triple-A. He’s incredible to watch. Pray he stays healthy

The post The Orioles Are Not Vegans appeared first on Baltimore Sports and Life.

PITCHERS

Grayson Rodriguez, 22 (AAA)
14.1 IP, 1.26 ERA, 14.44 K/9, 1.26 BB/9

We went into 2022 assuming Kyle Bradish would be the first pitching prospect to matriculate. Rodriguez might be worming his way into the lead. The prospect himself reportedly would like to build to a 100-pitch count before promotion, but I have doubts he’ll be given that much leeway at all in 2022. A lot of teams are only asking 60 to 75 pitches from their top prospects in their debut. It’s easy enough to manage those workloads when winning isn’t a priority.

I’ll be the first to admit, I don’t have good instincts for Orioles decision-making yet. Other orgs would be looking to promote Rodriguez after one more Triple-A start – assuming he’s just as dominant as his first three. Besides managing workload, he’s not getting anything from these appearances. He ought to be challenged for developmental purposes, and he might as well make as many starts as possible in the Majors. They’ve already eked out a seventh-season of club control, and the Super-2 deadline is ages from now.

Kyle Bradish, 25 (AAA)
9 IP, 1.00 ERA, 9.00 K/9, 2.00 BB/9

Good results aside, Bradish actually does have something to work on in the minors – inducing more whiffs. His 9.6 percent swinging strike rate is downright pedestrian. He managed a better rate last season (11.6% SwStr%), one that qualified as merely decent. Bradish is trending towards a back-of-the-rotation outcome at the moment. That said, we’re talking about two starts after a decent showing in 2021. As of today, at least another handful of Triple-A starts seems merited.

Ryan Watson, 24 (AA)
8 IP, 0.00 ERA, 11.25 K/9, 0.00 BB/9

I have limited information about Watson and the next two pitchers. Watson was a 39th-round pick by the Dodgers in 2016 and later signed with the Orioles in 2020 as a non-drafted free agent. Googling “Ryan Watson scouting report” yields this unhelpful video. What we do know is he’s made a pair of perfect four-inning appearances. He struck out 10 of 24 batters faced.

Easton Lucas, 25 (AA)
3 IP, 3.00 ERA, 18.00 K/9, 0.00 BB/9

Lucas, a southpaw, has a little more information floating out in the ether. The Orioles acquired him in the Jonathan Villar. While he doesn’t look like much from a traditional scouting perspective, he’s a spin-rate darling – especially his fastball. The most recent velocity report I have on him is from 2019 when he was sitting 88-92. He featured a near-elite 19.4 percent swinging strike rate in High-A last season. He’s old for his levels and will be Rule 5 eligible next winter. I suspect we might see him this year.

Nick Vespi, 26 (AAA)
6 IP, 0.00 ERA, 13.50 K/9, 0.00 BB/9

Vespi’s been with the Orioles since the 2015 draft. He’s approaching minor league free agency. After a strong start for Norfolk, including a couple saves, he is well on his way to making the roster later this season. Another southpaw with ground ball tendencies and scant public scouting reports, Vespi seemingly has the raw stuff to be a high leverage reliever. He’ll need to overcome errant command.

HITTERS

Hudson Haskin, 23 (AA)
27 PA, 4 HR, .560/.593/1.160

Sometimes, everything a hitter touches turns to gold. Already this season, Haskin has a triple-double and a triple-homer game. These are rare feats at any level and speak to his power potential. He’s actually working through the middle of the field right now despite a pull-happy history. Perhaps a more balanced approach is the key to unlocking above average power for Haskin. He won’t maintain a .600 ISO or .769 BABIP. Obviously. Hopefully, he’ll improve upon a 29.6 percent strikeout rate as those other rates regress.

Jordan Westburg, 23 (AA)
49 PA, 4 HR, .282/.429/.641

Entering the season, many of us wondered which of Westburg, Gunnar Henderson, or Joey Ortiz would win the race to the Majors. Westburg has an early lead. He’s working counts like a champ while jumping on mashable pitches. At this rate, he’ll be in Triple-A by mid-May. His discipline leads to more strikeouts than are necessary for his contact profile, but that’s a small price to pay if the quality of his contact continues to play up.

Adam Hall, 22 (AA)
44 PA, 5 SB, .342/.432/.395

Hall’s profile isn’t especially beloved in today’s game. He has a little too much swing-and-miss for his current lack of power. He could try to put on weight to add pop, but that might cost him his above average speed. His wheels have sustained his career via consistently above average BABIPs. He’ll spray the ball on the ground to all fields and is currently tracking as a utility fielder – perhaps not dissimilar to Jorge Mateo with more singles and fewer extra base hits.

Jahmai Jones, 24 (AAA)
56 PA, 1 HR, 1 SB, .261/.393/.413

Another utility fielder, Jones is reminiscent of the many players who make a million in career earnings while spending most of their time in Triple-A. Last season, he posted a league average batting line in Triple-A and looked painfully overmatched in the Majors. He constantly fell behind in the count, leading to a 36 percent strikeout rate despite only 9.1 percent swinging strike rate (i.e. on par with 20% K% hitters). The outcomes range from Quad-A to second division starter. He’s probably already an upgrade on Rougned Odor and Mateo.

Terrin Vavra, 25 (AAA)
63 PA, 1 SB, .327/.435/.423

Earlier today, Vavra landed on the injured list with a hamstring strain of unknown* severity. Prior to that, he was on track to debut as soon as this month. He’s a passable utility fielder who fits best at second base. A left-handed hitter with plus discipline and contact skills, many around the game expect him to have a long career in the Majors – even if he doesn’t exceed 400 plate appearances very often.

*Unknown to us. The team and player presumably already know the grade of strain. Hamstring strains are one of those things you can almost self-diagnose as they happen. Speaking from personal experience.

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